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SYMPOSIUM
THE CHANGING FACE OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Editors’ Forward
We are pleased to present this Symposium on the revolution in
corporate compliance and its evolution in the financial services industry.
This is the annual symposium hosted by the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law on significant topics in the realm of
business law.
The format of the symposium is as follows. It begins with an
introduction by Professor Sean Griffith, followed by edited transcripts of
the two panel discussions and the keynote address.
The first panel is “Revolution: Challenging Corporate Norms?” and
addresses the question of whether the revolution in corporate
compliance challenges the established norms of corporate law and
corporate governance. The panel focuses on the trends in corporate
compliance, the effects of compliance across multiple industries, and the
different perspectives regarding compliance education and
professionalization. The second panel is “Evolution: Impacting
Financial Services” and analyzes how the compliance function has
evolved within the financial services industry. The panel focuses on the
current role of compliance and its impact on financial institutions.
We are grateful to our sponsor for the Symposium: The Corporate
Law Center.
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
SEAN GRIFFITH: My name is Sean Griffith. I am the T.J.
Maloney Chair and Professor of Law. I direct the Corporate Law Center
and I am the faculty adviser for the compliance programs at Fordham
University School of Law. It falls to me to welcome you to this
interesting symposium on the changing face of compliance and
corporate governance organized by the Fordham Journal of Corporate
& Financial Law and also by the Corporate Law Center. We are
especially proud of our Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which is
the number one cited student periodical on banking and financial
regulation, and we are very grateful for the help of the Journal in
organizing this event.
Fordham Law School, I am proud to say, is a leader in the area of
corporate compliance. The Law School offers a number of courses in the
area of compliance and two degree programs in corporate compliance.
In addition to offering a number of compliance programs for our JDs,
the Law School launched the first LLM in corporate compliance in the
United States just this past fall. Fordham Law School is also attempting
to put together a degree program for non-lawyers, a Masters in Science
of the Law, in the area of corporate compliance.
This is an exciting area for us. Fordham Law School is a true
believer in the importance of the compliance field. The School is just so
pleased today to have so many real leaders in the business area, chief
compliance officers from major financial institutions, and real thought
leaders in this area in our panels. We are going to have two panels today
followed by keynote remarks. Panel I will be academic in focus. It
features three academic commentators in the area of compliance. Panel
II will be more practitioner-focused with a greater real world
orientation. It will be moderated by Gerald Manwah, a managing
director in financial crime at Barclays and one of the directors of our
compliance programs at Fordham. At the end of the morning, we will
have keynote remarks by Tom Baxter, who is general counsel and
executive vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I
want to thank you all for being here and I want to turn the festivities
over to my colleague, Steve Thel.
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STEVEN THEL: Hi, I am Steve Thel. I teach here at the Law
School and I want to welcome you too. As Sean said, Panel I, entitled
“Revolution: Challenging Corporate Norms?,” is a group of academics
and the first speaker is Sean. After that, Geoff Miller from New York
University School of Law and Miriam Baer from Brooklyn Law School
will speak. Then we will have time for questions. With that, let us start
out with Sean.
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PANEL I: REVOLUTION: CHALLENGING CORPORATE NORMS?
SEAN GRIFFITH: I have fifteen minutes to present a paper that I
have been working on for some time about the relationship between
corporate governance and compliance as a legal academic in the area of
corporate law. I have long focused on corporate governance, and the
question I sought to answer is, what is the relationship between
corporate law and corporate governance? The paper is partially
motivated by a quotation that appeared in the New York Times about
two years ago. The quotation is from somebody who is close to a
banking board of a big financial institution. He joked, “the only thing
bank directors have more of these days is meetings.”1
Regulators have all but stripped the board of the main powers that
they had before the crisis. If the board has been stripped of its main
governance powers, who is governing? I think a lot of who is doing
governance in major financial institutions and other types of
corporations is the compliance function.
What I would like to talk about and hopefully persuade you of
today are the following four points with some sub-points. The first one
is that compliance is important, and I probably do not have to spend a
lot of time with folks in this room emphasizing that compliance is
important. We are here because we know that compliance is important.
However, I do want to try to persuade you that compliance is
governance and that it is a big deal because it will create implications
for how we think about governance, implications for how we think
about corporate law theory, and implications for how we should think
about doing compliance. Then at the end, there will be a little policy
suggestion. What I really want to focus on is a theoretical problem.
Point two covers the definitions of compliance and governance.
What is compliance and what is governance? We can take a definition of
compliance from Geoff’s book where he says that compliance is “the
processes by which an organization seeks to ensure that employees and
other constituents conform to applicable norms—which can include
either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal rules of the

1. Susanne Craig, At Banks, Board Pay Soars amid Cutbacks, NY TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 31, 2013, 9:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/payfor-boards-at-banks-soars-amid-cutbacks/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/RVA6-NM84].
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organization.”2 What is compliance? Compliance is the means by which
firms adapt their behavior or the behavior of actors within the firm to a
relevant universe of norms. That relevant universe of norms is important
because it can include not only the legal strictures that the firm operates
within but also things like reputation, internal ethics, policies, goals, and
aspirational norms.
As an operational matter, what is compliance? It is a department,
right? Something new about compliance is that there is a whole
department headed by an officer or the chief compliance officer with a
staff. In many organizations, the chief compliance officer is the co-equal
of the chief legal officer and that is a big deal, right? This new
department exists within the organization. You might say, “Well, so
what? There is also an IT department in organizations and nobody talks
about information technology and governance.” But compliance is
different from information technology for two reasons. One is that
compliance does core governance functions. What is governance? Geoff
also defines it in his book. Governance involves the structure of control
within an organization and it is defined by reference to the process of
decision-making which has the ultimate control of the firm.3
Now, when we talk about governance in corporate law, we
normally talk about two different ways of thinking. One is what happens
inside the firm, also known as intrafirm governance. If you are a
Delaware corporate law junkie, this is the stuff of the duty of care.
Intrafirm governance involves the question of how to engage in
monitoring and overseeing the internal affairs of the business. Then
there is another aspect of corporate governance which involves
ownership-type decisions such as takeovers and proxy fights. Intra-firm
and corporate governance are essentially identical. Monitoring and
overseeing the internal affairs of the organization is what compliance
does, and that is a core corporate governance function and that is a big
deal. Compliance is different from information technology in the sense
that it has a core governance component. It is also different from

2. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
3. Id. at 2.

OF

GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
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information technology in the sense of who the author of that
department is. I will come back to that in a second.
This furthers the point that compliance is really governance. This is
an organizational chart of the compliance function for the Wal-Mart
Corporation. 4 Wal-Mart is a retailer and not in a heavily regulated
industry like financial services or pharmaceuticals. Wal-Mart got in
trouble for bribery and completely revamped its compliance function.
What does this show you? It shows you that there are all these different
compliance officers with all these different responsibilities in all these
different regions around the world. Then there is this part, which is the
part that I like best. When Wal-Mart revised its compliance function, it
nested within compliance fourteen areas: anti-corruption, anti-money
laundering, anti-trust, consumer protection, environment, food safety,
health and safety, health and wellness, labor and employment, licenses
and permits, privacy, product safety, responsible sourcing, and trade.5
All of these functions come within the Wal-Mart compliance
department. These are general internal control functions; the general
processes which involve how Wal-Mart conducts its business on a dayto-day basis. That is part of what compliance can be and has become for
many organizations. Compliance exerts a broad governance function.
That is this point.
A second part of what is interesting about compliance is where
compliance comes from. Here is a model of the firm. We normally think
of corporations as boxes. Sitting on top of that corporation is a board of
directors. Inside the box, there are the executive functions of the firm—
the chief officer positions. Normally, when corporate law academics like
me talk about the ways in which we influence the governance of firms,
we talk about influencing the board of directors. For example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the audit committee members
of the board be wholly independent.6 That is a governance change in that
it is a change directed at the board of directors’ level. What is different
about compliance is that the governance changes are aimed at the
executive level. The changes are aimed at the functional level of the
4. WAL-MART, WALMART’S GLOBAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM REPORT ON FISCAL
YEAR 2014, at 3 illus. Global Compliance Organizational Structure (2014).
5. Id. at 4 illus. 14 Global Compliance Subject Matter Areas.
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 77577 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)).
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firm where the business actually operates. For example, after a money
laundering failure, a financial institution must hire hundreds or
thousands of employees to engage in the monitoring and surveillance of
transactions. That is a governance change, but it is also a change within
the organization. That is to say, within the structures of how the firm
actually conducts its business, as opposed to just oversight structures on
the top.
What else is different? Those changes come from the federal
government. They come from incentives under the sentencing
guidelines, where you do not get as much of a sanction if you have an
effective compliance department. They come from incentives under the
charging function of prosecutors and they also come under prosecutorial
agreements. What does that mean? Well, there is a big implication here
too. Here is a model of corporate governance. The shareholders are on
the bottom and the evil managers are on the top. Normally, when we
talk about how corporate governance is made, we talk about a process of
negotiation between the shareholders and the managers, but that is not
what we are talking about here. We are talking about compliance
because compliance is really a function of government intervention,
often by a prosecutor. Compliance is not made by agreement between
prosecutors and shareholders because these people never meet and they
never agree. Compliance is made in an agreement between prosecutors
and managers. The agency cost issue is all over the place. Where
corporate law academics normally consider agency cost problems as
between managers and shareholders, here, we have agency cost
problems where the shareholders are not even involved. There is no vote
to approve compliance changes that the government prosecutor brings
into the firm.
This makes me think about a variety of the Coase Theorem. There
is a famous line from Ronald Coase’s article, The Nature of the Firm.7
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase writes, “If a workman moves from
department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in
relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.”8 When I think about
7.
8.

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Id. at 387.
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compliance, I think we have to revise that view of why people move
around in the firm, and here is how I would revise it. If a workman
moves into the compliance department, he does not go there because of
a change in prices, but because the government has ordered the company
to hire him. What does that mean? It means that the government is
making corporate governance. It is an executive level function. What
should we think about that? Well, what do we think about government
lawmaking in general?
Here we can juxtapose the interest of the United States with the
interest of Delaware, which is a traditional corporate governance
regulator. One thing that academics have pointed out about Delaware is
that there are only about two constituencies at play in the making of
corporate governance under Delaware law: shareholders and managers.
Those are the only two parties that make the choice about where the
firm incorporates. As a result, shareholders and managers are the only
two parties that Delaware law seeks to appease. That is not the same in
the federal government. The United States Government, through the
Securities and Exchange Commission and other types of regulatory
organizations, does worry about shareholders and managers, but the
federal government has many other constituencies that it protects such
as laborers, creditors, consumers, and social responsibility-type
interests.
What is interesting about the federal government is that there is a
disincentive for the federal government to be overly active in corporate
governance. The disincentive arises because legislators get worked up
after scandals when they feel like there is a broad consensus for reform.
But those are legislators. If corporate governance via compliance is
made not primarily by legislators, but by individual prosecutors, there is
a question about when prosecutors get motivated. What motivates a
prosecutor to act? Does that mean that a government prosecutor is more
likely to enforce the other constituencies that the federal government is
responsible to more aggressively than a legislator?
All right, I am just waving at these issues. I am obviously not
closing them for right now. My third big implication is for compliance
itself. What does it mean that we have compliance coming into
organizations as a result of prosecutorial interests following periods of
corporate scandal or corporate failures? What are the implications
specifically for compliance? One implication is that we do not really
know for sure whether the compliance functions that these outside
influencers are bringing in are cost effective from the organizational
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point of view. Is the growth of compliance costs justified by the value
that they produce to an organization? There are a couple of different
ways that you can break that question down. One is whether the
infrastructure that we build around compliance creates value that we can
show regulators to cause them to forbear in the event that they become
interested in our organization versus whether that infrastructure really
produces benefits net of costs. How do we demonstrate the effectiveness
of that infrastructure?
Again, there are two ways of thinking about this. How do we
demonstrate effectiveness to a regulator? One answer might be to show
them how busy we are in our compliance department, how many
training hours our employees have been through, what percentage of
completion our employees have finished compliance modules, and so
on. How would we demonstrate the effectiveness of compliance, not
necessarily to a regulator, but to a CEO or an investor?
The other question might be, is compliance really the highest and
best use of our time and resources? To put it in a less provocative way,
is there an additional marginal investment in compliance? Let us say
that we are going to have some compliance. How do we know that this
additional investment is really the highest and best use of our resources?
What is the right level? For example, let us say that a bank gets in
trouble for an anti-money laundering violation and is ordered by the
federal government to increase staff compliance from 80 to 1000. Eighty
might not be enough, but what is the theoretical support for 1000 being
the right number and what level of support is there for any of these
things being at the right level? How do companies pick? How should
they comply?
One answer might be that there is compliance creep going on here.
What is compliance creep? Compliance creep occurs when different
organizations look at other peer organizations and the infrastructures
that they have built around compliance. Whether they want to or not,
they have to build similar infrastructures. Why? Because if you are bank
X and you get in trouble, the enforcer is going to say to you, “Well, look
at bank Y and Z. Look at their compliance infrastructure. Yours is forty
percent less and now you are in trouble.” Post hoc ergo propter hoc.
“You are in trouble because you are forty percent leaner in compliance
than they are.” How can you do that? The answer is thinking about that
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ex-ante. That bank knows that that is a possible argument it is going to
face and therefore has an incentive to up staff even if it is not worth it.
What should we do about this? This is an assumption, by the way,
that there is anything to be done or that we should do anything. One
possibility is that we should just accept that this is how governance
works now. Delaware corporate law has abandoned intrafirm corporate
governance because of the business judgment rule. Thus, Delaware is
out of it. The regulatory state enforced a vacuum. The feds are in it and
it is just the way it is going to be, and we have to learn to live with that.
If we wanted to put the genie back in the bottle, how could we do it? It
is not that complicated. One way is to take away the incentive structure
for government-sponsored corporate therapeutics so that there are no
more incentives for effective compliance. Organizations would no
longer get a sentencing act reduction and no longer get a charging
reduction for having an effective compliance function. Just take it off
the table. “We cannot give you a reduction for that. We are not even
going to look at it. We are not even going to ask and we are not going to
ask in our DPAs [deferred prosecution agreements] and NPAs [nonprosecution agreements]. We are not going to ask you to implement
compliance reforms because we, the federal government, do not know
what good compliance reforms are and we think you might not know
either. Thus, we certainly cannot foist them upon you.”
What is the result of that? What if we did that? Would companies
stop complying with the law? The answer is no because we are not
asking the federal government to just stop bringing enforcement actions.
The government should bring enforcement actions to the full extent of
the law and extract sanctions as much as it possibly can. If companies no
longer had the federal incentive of building effective compliance
programs, companies would build compliance programs that are cost
effective and that make sense from the organizations’ perspective.
Another thing we could do is get judges more involved in the
termination of investigations. A lot of these DPAs and NPAs happen
without significant, or any, judicial supervision. Judges should be
involved. In other words, there is not an adverse party here. Judges
should become that adverse party. Maybe judges should permit
shareholder objections to DPAs and NPAs.
Finally, I would say that we should have public disclosure of the
details of company compliance programs. One of the reasons that we do
not know whether compliance works or know what works in compliance
is that companies do not report what they do in compliance. It is not
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possible to run studies about the effectiveness of anti-money laundering
structure X versus anti-money laundering structure Y. We cannot run
those studies because we do not have that data because companies do
not report. Why do we not take the compliance incentive out and make
companies report what they do in compliance so that the capital markets
can create a compliance incentive in place of more direct federal
intervention? Those are my provocative remarks.
STEVE THEL: Thank you, Sean. Once again, Sean speaks for
himself, not for Fordham Law School. Our next presenter is Geoff
Miller who is the Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law at NYU and
director of their program on corporate compliance enforcement, and also
the author of the first casebook on compliance. Geoff?
GEOFFREY MILLER: First of all, thank you for the invite, Sean,
and also to the student editors. I think it is a testament to the importance
of this topic that on a snowy day in New York, so many people have
come to this event. The event itself bespeaks the importance of the topic.
Congratulations to the organizers. As Steve mentioned, I am interested
in compliance in part because NYU has a program. It is not quite the
same as Fordham’s program. It is not a degree-offering program, but it
is an academic program on corporate compliance and enforcement that I
run with Jennifer Arlen, another professor at NYU.
Also, we have recently had the good fortune of the American Law
Institute [ALI] initiating a project on principles of governance, risk
management, and compliance, of which I am the chief reporter, so that,
hopefully, will develop some principles that might be useful in assessing
compliance. Also, we hope it will respond to the concerns that Sean
mentioned, namely that compliance today is often developed from a sort
of ad hoc, back-of-the-envelope way through enforcement proceedings.
We are hoping to have a somewhat more systematic analysis in the ALI
project.
I would also like to second Sean’s remarks about the importance
and novelty of this topic. Compliance really is something new in
governance, and it is not only something new in governance but it is also
emblematic of broader changes in the governance of complex
organizations that are really significant, and that we in academics have
only begun to get our hands around. This is something that people who
are in organizations know about, but believe me, most of us in
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academics have not known about it. It is something new for us, and we
are only beginning to grasp the significance of the changes that have
occurred. It is also something new in academics. There were no courses
in compliance, no book on compliance. Over the past year, this is
changing very rapidly. I published a book, as Steve mentioned, that can
be used as teaching materials, and compliance courses are developing all
over the country. Also, there is scholarship in compliance, as Sean’s
paper illustrates. Miriam has also done excellent scholarship in this area
as well as others.
Compliance is theoretically and practically interesting and
beginning to become a real academic field with real substance and real
literature. Compliance is important because it has practical
consequences, among other things. There are many jobs in compliance,
but compliance is also very important to the welfare of highly regulated
institutions such as banks and other firms. There is also an important
theoretical aspect. If you think about it, what is law but the effect that
rules have on people’s behavior? Until recently, the compliance function
has been a black box. We have not seen into it, but we have observed
the output, which is people behaving in certain ways. You might have
rules on insider trading, but those rules get filtered through compliance
departments into concrete rules for action that may only have a
tangential relationship to the rules themselves. The compliance
department has to deal with traders who are not sophisticated in law and
need to have workable standards for conduct that can be administered
and enforced. This is something we have known nothing about, but it is
really a very important part of American law and we are only beginning
to study that.
Also, I believe this is a new field that goes beyond law because, as
many of you know, compliance departments have lawyers, but they also
have non-lawyers. The compliance function is partly a legal function,
partly a management function, and partly involves other important
topics such as sociology, psychology, and other fields. This is a
multidisciplinary area of study that is not limited to law. We are into
something that is interesting and changing rapidly. Now, my paper is
quite academic, but it is motivated by practical concerns. I would like to
say that part of the academic interest in this topic is that we academics
need to learn from you—at least those of you who are here in the
audience who work in compliance. It is not that you need to learn from
us, even though we are teachers. We need to learn from you because you
have the information that we lack, and we are late in catching up to the
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importance of this topic. A lot of what we are hoping to do is learn from
people who are in the area about how it actually works.
Now, the paper I am going to present has to do with the concern
that Sean mentioned, which is the concern for the efficiency
implications of compliance. I am going to try to do this looking at the
concept of an effective compliance program, but not considering this
issue in the way it is ordinarily understood,. We will look at it through a
little bit more of a fundamental lens.
The standards for effective compliance programs take the form of
lists. There are many of them out there. The Bank Secrecy Act has four
elements: internal policies, compliance officer, training, and internal
audit.9 The Volcker Rule has six requirements: written policies, internal
controls, framework of accountability, independent audit, training, and
maintaining records. 10 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has ten
requirements and some are the same, but other ones include third party
due diligence, confidential reporting, pre-acquisition due diligence, and
post-acquisition integration. 11 Leslie Caldwell of the Department of
Justice recently gave a speech where she identified either nine or ten
requirements of effective compliance programs, depending upon how
you read the speech.12
These are all quite interesting, but notice that they are lists. Lists
have great value because we can look at the lists and see the things we
need to do. Lists also have some shortcomings. The shortcoming is, in
part, that we do not know what is truly important and what is less
9. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012)), amended by USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 255.20 (2014).
11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1); see also CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DOJ & ENF’T
DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 57-62 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015
/01/16/guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/2K98-BL5K].
12. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Compliance Week Conference (May 19, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-deliversremarks-compliance-week-conference [http://perma.cc/FYH7-QS7W0].
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important. There is no weighing of the lists. Also because the lists vary,
you get the idea that some things might be included in some lists that
other lists left out. We do not know the comprehensiveness of the lists.
Lists are valuable. They share common themes. They are concrete and
can be implemented. They are adapted to specific issues. They probably
reflect the agencies’ stake, but they do have these shortcomings: not
systematic and not comprehensive. They do not provide guidance on
how factors are weighed and they seem to reflect slightly different
standings of the topic. That is where we are about. If you want to look at
the standards for an effective compliance program, you look at these
lists and try to derive information from them.
These lists are not quite as chaotic as the ones referred to in
Borges’ short story, Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge,
which categorizes all the animals in the form of a list. The list includes
animals belonging to the emperor, embalmed ones, those that are
trained, suckling pigs, mermaids, fabulous ones, stray dogs, those
included in this classification, those that tremble madly, innumerable
ones, those drawn with a camelhair brush, those that broke the flower
vase, and those that resemble flies from afar.13 The lists that have been
developed to define effective compliance programs are not crazy and
chaotic like this, but they have some resemblance in that they do not
identify the central quality that makes a compliance program effective.
As a useful supplement, not as a replacement by any means, and
not even as something that can always be of practical use, but as an
intellectual exercise, it is useful to try to get to the fundamental core of
an effective compliance program with a simple economic analysis. Now,
there are going to be some equations. We start with an assumption that
employees of a profit-maximizing firm engage in random illegal
conduct. The government imposes a fine for proven violations that is
administrated with a defined probability z. The sanction that the firm
experienced is the probability of sanction multiplied by the fine, which
in this formula is called pf. We assume that the government sets the
sanction for violations of social cost. Of course, the government does
not do this, as Sean pointed out, but tries to do it to some extent.
The social cost equals pf. If the government imposes the full social
cost with violations on the firm, then the firm’s incentive is to do what is
13. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, in OTHER
INQUISITIONS: 1937-1952 at 101, 103 (Ruth L. C. Simms trans., 1964).
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socially optimal because it has to bear the social cost of any violations
that occur. We now have a firm that is profit maximizing, but also
incentivized to engage in optimal action from a social point of view.
What is the firm going to do? First, it is going to spend money on
compliance, what I call C.
How much is the firm going to spend? The first step is
understanding that the more money the firm spends on compliance, the
more violations the firm deters. But, this feature occurs at a decreasing
rate. At the beginning, the firm achieves a lot through compliance
expenditures, and then there is a decreasing deterrence of violations as
the spend goes up. Eventually, the firm will achieve little or nothing for
each additional compliance dollar spent.
Now, if you have compliance, what is the firm’s cost of violations?
It is simply the cost of the violations that remain with compliance:
1
That is the firm’s cost of violations with the compliance program in
effect. Now, when will the firm engage in compliance? It will do this if
the cost of sanctions with compliance is less than or equal to the costs of
sanctions without compliance. The cost of sanctions with compliance
has to be less than or equal to pf. If you improve cost by having a
compliance program, you are going to implement the program. This is
mathematically equivalent to the proposition that the firm will spend on
compliance if the cost of compliance is less than or equal to the cost of
the sanctions you avoid.
As long as the cost of your compliance program is less than the cost
of the sanctions you avoid, you are going to spend on compliance. That
makes sense because that is the profit-maximizing thing to do. How
much will the firm spend on compliance? It wants to expend resources
up to the point where the marginal cost of compliance equals the
marginal cost of the sanctions avoided. That optimal point of
compliance I call Ĉ. It generates a benefit to the firm as compared to the
situation without compliance equal to z(pf) - Ĉ. That means that cost of
sanctions avoided minus the cost of the compliance program is the
benefit to the firm from an optimal compliance operation.
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Ĉ is the optimal amount a firm will spend on compliance. At least
there is a first approximation and it maximizes the social surplus. It is
the efficient thing for the firm to do and it is what society wants the firm
to do. Society does not want the firm to spend more than Ĉ because if
the firm spends more than Ĉ, you get more cost of compliance than you
get benefit in terms of violations avoided.
That gives us some definition of an effective compliance program
within this framework. An effective compliance program is the set of
policies and procedures that a rational, profit maximizing firm would
establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of
violations. That is what we like to look for.
Now, that is the basic path of the paper. I do not have time to go
into detail, but I will just spend the next three minutes describing this.
The one very interesting implication of this has to do with Gary
Becker’s theory of punishment. 14 Becker suggested that the optimal
punishment is one where you have a low probability of detection and a
high fine. You get the same degree of deterrence with the low
probability of detection and a high fine as with a high probability of
detection and a low fine. But you get this deterrent at a lower
expenditure because the government needs fewer policemen on the beat
if you have a low probability of detection.
Becker’s theory is commonly interpreted to say that the optimal
enforcement regime involves a low probability of detection and a high
fine. What this interpretation misses is the fact that if there is a low
probability of detection and high fine, the firm that is subject to the
enforcement is going to adopt costly compliance programs. The Becker
optimal enforcement model, suggesting a low probability of detection
and high fine, needs to be qualified by the fact that we have to take into
account the cost of compliance.
Let me turn to the concern, voiced by Sean and others, about the
government imposing too much compliance spend on companies. Why
is the government likely to do this? Government officials do not spend
that money, but experience a reputational cost if there is a violation. As
a result, government officials want the firm to spend an inefficient
amount on compliance in some cases. This theory would provide some
14.

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes
eds., 1974).
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support for the proposition that firms should spend less in compliance
than what the government would prefer. Obviously, they should not
adopt less than the socially optimal amount, but less than the
government would prefer because the government would prefer firms to
spend more in compliance than is socially optimal.
This is not to say that we should not have compliance. It is
important that we have compliance. But we do not have to have
compliance to the point where society is worse off with the compliance
program in place than it would be without the program in place.
Thank you very much.
STEVE THEL: Thank you Geoff. Our next speaker is Miriam Baer
from Brooklyn Law School. She is also active as a corporate scholar and
has a history as a prosecutor. Thus, she offers, perhaps, a perspective
that the first two speakers felt was overheard, but I think she is going to
have perspectives that you have not yet heard.
MIRIAM BAER: Thank you so much. As Steve’s introduction
indicated, I am a lawyer and I identify with lawyers. I highlight that
because what I am going to say may sound somewhat crazy or antilawyer. Although I was a prosecutor, I also worked for Verizon in
compliance. So, I have some perspective from the compliance side, and
I am sympathetic to the challenges that the corporate compliance officer
typically faces on a daily basis.
Sean and Geoff very nicely laid out for you the big issues for
compliance at 30,000 feet. I am interested in a much narrower issue that
is closer to the ground, which is the corporate investigation. When we
talk about compliance, we mean many things. We mean education and
training. We mean the inculcation of norms and the creation of policies.
We also mean how well the corporation investigates itself, identifies
wrongdoing, and reports that wrongdoing to authorities. I am
particularly interested, not just in the corporate investigation, but in the
corporate attorney-client privilege. I am going to talk a little bit about
some recent cases that have arisen in the last year or so, and then
consider the normative implications of the corporate attorney client
privilege. Namely, if we step back and remove our cloaks as lawyers, do
we really think the privilege is worth preserving, at least as it arises
within the corporate investigation? That is my question for today.
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Let us just start right now. There is a very big structural compliance
debate out there that many of you are aware of. We all understand that
there is a general counsel’s office. There is something out there that we
think of as the corporate compliance office. There is a great debate
whether the compliance function should be separate from the general
counsel’s office and have a direct line to the corporation’s board of
directors. Then we ask who should be conducting the corporation’s
investigations? How do these two functions join together to conduct the
corporation’s internal investigations?
There are also smaller issues. When I say smaller, I do not mean
smaller as in less important to the firm, but, certainly, narrower issues.
Should we have in-house counsel playing a role in the investigation?
Should we have outside counsel? Should we, in fact, have independent
outside counsel, meaning we have a law firm that has never had any
kind of relationship with the company before? Now, to some degree, the
situation itself will dictate the outcome. If you wake up the next
morning and the New York Times has some huge blockbuster piece
detailing how your subsidiary in Mexico was paying lots and lots of
bribes to government officials, you will probably ask someone other
than in-house counsel to investigate that.
Nevertheless, these are the types of debates that one frequently
hears. Certainly among legal scholars, there have been a number of
debates regarding the appropriate structure of corporate investigation.
Underlying these debates is the assumption that legal counsel ought to
direct the investigation in order to retain and protect the company’s
attorney-client privilege. In this talk, I want to take the step back and
ask, well, what about the attorney-client privilege?
Let me start with just a little bit of background, which many of you
here already know. If you were to climb into your DeLorean and go
back in time, the big issue in the 1970s and 1980s before the Supreme
Court decided Upjohn15 pertained to the identity of the privilege holder.
Who represented the corporation? Who was it that could speak to the
corporation’s attorney such that we would say this person’s
communication was privileged? At the time, some courts had held that
the employee had to be within some sort of control group of the
corporation for his communication to be privileged. Upjohn upended
these lower court decisions. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court confirmed
15.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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that the corporation retains its own attorney-client privilege.16 The Court
rejected the control group test as overly narrow and emphasized how
important it is for the corporation’s lawyer to be able to consult with as
many employees as possible so that the lawyer can obtain the factual
information he needs to provide effective legal advice. A broader
privilege, the Court advised, was necessary to encourage full and frank
communication throughout the organization.
Upjohn was a company that had received information that
suggested wrongdoing and then used its own internal lawyers to
investigate these allegations. The company’s attorneys distributed
questionnaires to the company’s employees, who in turn, provided
information about the alleged wrongdoing. The employees knew that
there was an investigation and the company eventually disclosed the
result of its investigation to the SEC and the IRS. The IRS did not quite
trust Upjohn’s recitation of what had happened so it decided to conduct
its own investigation and sought direct access to the questionnaires and
corresponding memoranda of employee interviews. Were these
investigation materials privileged? Answering in the affirmative, the
Supreme Court explained that a broad privilege was necessary to
encourage the corporation’s employees to come and talk to its attorneys.
Free communication, in turn, would improve compliance.
Upjohn’s holding rests upon two major assumptions: First, that the
privilege improves internal disclosure, and second, that internal
disclosure improves compliance. That the Court is thinking, in 1981,
about corporate compliance is quite remarkable. But is the Court correct
in its intuition that lawyers improve corporate compliance? Yes, we as
lawyers think of ourselves as improving compliance, but we should
consider whether this claim is as firm as we desire it to be, or whether
the privilege generates other unintended consequences, such as the
efficiency concerns, which may relate in part to what Geoff and Sean
were talking about, although in a much narrower way.
Now, one thing the Supreme Court does not do in Upjohn is
provide us a bright line. The Court does not say, in effect, “Okay,
corporations, from now on, if you want to make sure your
16.

See id.
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communications fall within the privilege, here is what you have to do.”
As a result, because of the Court’s holistic approach to privilege, one
often comes across lower court opinions that inquire how closely a
particular investigation resembles the investigation in Upjohn. Based on
that determination, courts will then determinate whether the privilege
applies.
Now, let’s talk about corporate privilege debates throughout the
1990s and 2000s. The big issue was waiver, which arose when the
United States government, through the Department of Justice and United
States Attorneys’ offices, began to place pressure on companies to
comply with the law. Remember, in federal law, the corporation can be
very easily prosecuted for a crime. Why? Because if you are a
corporation and one of your employees commits a crime with an intent,
not the intent, but an intent to aid the corporation, for example, keeping
the company’s stock price high, you as the corporation can be held
criminally liable, under respondeat superior principles, for what the
employee did. That means for most corporations today, if you have
10,000 employees or 50 employees, it is not all that hard to imagine that
one of them is actually committing a crime with an intent to help
themselves, but also to help the corporation. This means corporations
can very easily come under fire if prosecutors want to, in fact, prosecute
them for their employees’ crimes.
One of the issues that arises in the 1990’s and 2000’s is, of course,
the deferred prosecution agreement and the prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion in offering an agreement in lieu of seeking formal charges and
an indictment. In deciding between an indictment and a deferred
prosecution agreement, prosecutors consider certain factors. One of
those factors is how cooperative the corporation has been in regard to
the government’s investigation of wrongdoing, and one of the ways the
government measured cooperation in the 1990s and part of 2000s was
by asking whether the corporation had waived its attorney-client
privilege.
Initially, the question that corporations were most worried about
was whether a waiver of privilege executed with the government would
apply equally to everyone else. If a shareholder plaintiff’s attorney
wished to sue the corporation, would that attorney gain access to
otherwise privileged materials from which the government determined
there was no crime? This was the “selective waiver” question that was
initially circulating when the government first began to demand waivers
from cooperating corporate defendants in the 1990’s. Ultimately, a
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majority of courts rejected the selective waiver doctrine, leading most
corporations to conclude that a waiver of privilege would be broadly
construed.
During the 2000s, a different problem surfaced, which one might
call the “involuntary waiver” problem. Prosecutors reportedly sought
waivers too often and a “culture of waiver” became pervasive.
Additional issues arose relating to how the corporation paid for
attorney’s fees for its employees. Eventually, Congress threatened
legislation, culminating in hearings held by Senator Arlen Spector.
Faced with the prospect of an Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act,17
the Department of Justice retreated and revised its charging policies.
The Thompson Memo,18 which previously encouraged corporations to
waive privilege, was replaced by the McNulty Memo,19 which offered a
softer, lighter touch with regard to corporate privilege. It too was
replaced by the Filip Memo,20 which eventually was incorporated into
the United States Attorneys’ Manual. The Filip Memo explicitly directs
prosecutors not to request core attorney-client communications, but
maintains the importance of prosecutorial fact-gathering.21
Thus, the claim that prosecutors commonly make is some variant of
the following: “Look, we are not trying to find out what you said to your

17. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong.
(2009); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4325, 111th Cong.
(2009).
18. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ab
a/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheck
dam.pdf [http://perma.cc/VN7Y-G58H].
19. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/l
egacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/6F9X-9TNQ].
20. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/l
egacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [http://perma.cc/RR6P-U5G5].
21. Id.
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attorney. We do not really want to be in the boardroom and find out
what happened when the board members were talking to the attorney
and asking for advice. What we are really worried about is the
nondisclosure of facts to the government.” That, at least, is the argument
that one often hears. “We just want the facts.”
That brings us to the present day. What are the contemporary
corporate attorney-client privilege-related issues that concern us today?
Two cases stand out. One is In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 22 which
involved a defense contractor that used to be a part of Halliburton (I am
referring to it as “KBR.”) The other case involves Wal-Mart.23 The case
relates to a newspaper article some of you may recall from 2012, when
the New York Times detailed how a Wal-Mart subsidiary, Walmex,
allegedly engaged in bribery, and further claimed that the investigation
of Walmex by Wal-Mart was inappropriately quashed. 24 These
allegations led to a 2014 lawsuit in the Delaware courts concerning the
proper application of the privilege when shareholders seek documents in
order to evaluate the possibility of filing a shareholder derivative
lawsuit.25
As the KBR case demonstrates, courts and litigators still debate
whether a given investigation is just an “investigation” or whether it is
an attorney-client privileged investigation. As Geoff previously stated,
corporate compliance has become big business and it has expanded
beyond the general counsel’s office. That means we have a lot of people
conducting investigations and not all of them are attorneys. Now, there
is no rule that says it must be an attorney who asks the questions of a
given employee for the privilege to apply. For example, if I am an
attorney investigating what occurred, the exact questioner does not have
to be me. I might supervise an investigator.
Nevertheless, in determining whether the purpose of the
investigation was to secure legal advice, courts tend to look at the fact
that there were a lot of attorneys doing these kinds of investigations or,
22.
23.

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95
A.3d 1264 (Del. 2014).
24. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After TopLevel Struggle, N.Y. TIMES: BUSINESS DAY (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2
012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquirysilenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HF8R-RPAJ].
25. See Wal-Mart Stores, 95 A.3d at 1267.
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conversely, whether most or all of the questioners were not attorneys. It
tends to matter who is doing the questioning, and whether the person
doing the questioning is working under the close supervision of an
attorney, or not really communicating with an attorney all that much. As
Judge Posner tells us, “there is no private investigator’s privilege.”26 In
other words, if the investigation is the brainchild of a private
investigator, there is no privilege.
In Kellogg Brown & Root, attorneys played a role in the
investigation, but the lower court denied the privilege on the grounds
that KBR’s investigation was not undertaken solely for the purpose of
securing legal advance. KBR had investigated an employee’s allegations
that it had overbilled the United States on a defense contract. 27 The
investigation, according to the lower court, was ineligible for the
privilege because the company undertook the investigation for
“regulatory reasons.” Since Department of Defense regulations required
the company to conduct internal investigations, it would have sought the
relevant information anyway from its employees. The lower court
opinion makes a point of observing how different KBR’s investigation
looks from the investigation conducted in Upjohn.
The DC Circuit eventually overturned the lower court’s decision on
mandamus.28 In doing so, the Circuit declared that seeking legal advice
need not be the sole purpose of an investigation. Thus, the Circuit
rejected the narrow “but-for” test that the lower court favored.
Presumably, the Circuit felt that it had to do this if it was going to keep
the corporate compliance function intact. No company today can
genuinely say, “The only reason I executed this investigation was to
secure legal advice.” Or, more formally, “But for seeking legal advice,
the company never would have conducted this investigation.” Every
company that investigates itself today does so, not only to secure legal
advice, but also as part of its overall attempt to comply with legal or
regulatory regimes. Meanwhile, the DC Circuit also discussed the
26. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th
Cir. 2007).
27. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 37 F. Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2014).
28. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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resemblance between KBR’s investigation and Upjohn’s, and unlike the
lower court, found KBR’s investigation “indistinguishable” from
Upjohn’s.
The DC Circuit’s discussion of the lower court’s ruling in KBR
portrays the lower court judge as coming up with this but-for test all by
himself, but, in fact, the lower court judge was relying on an earlier
district court case, ISS Marine, 29 which also involved an internal
investigation relating to a defense contract.
Now, in ISS Marine, the defense contractor initially contacts
Arnold & Porter and in response, the law firm sends an engagement
letter detailing what it will do and how much its work will cost.
Concerned that an investigation conducted entirely by Arnold and Porter
will be very expensive, ISS Marine decides instead that it will conduct
its own investigation (with some initial input by Arnold & Porter), and
then remit the results to Arnold & Porter, who can then advise ISS
Marine what to do. The issue then becomes: Is ISS Marine’s internal
investigation privileged? The court in ISS Marine declares that it is not,
in part because the privilege claim appears “premised on a gimmick [to]
exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain
them in a watered-down capacity to consult.”30
ISS Marine was never overturned and presumably remains good
law. Accordingly, if you are a company and you are looking at what
goes on in these various courts, you have to be aware of the fact that
efforts to make your investigation cheaper by, for example, using fewer
attorneys, may well place the investigation within some non-privilege
category. Then again, even when the corporation unabashedly uses
attorneys to conduct its investigation, it still may find itself losing the
privilege’s protection.
Consider another case: Wal-Mart. In 2012, a New York Times
article announced allegations of bribery by Walmex, Wal-Mart’s
subsidiary. 31 The Times article includes an allegation that certain
members of management intentionally short-circuited the company’s
internal investigation of wrongdoing. Thus, the wrongdoing itself relates
to how the internal investigation was conducted. Shareholders ultimately
filed a request for books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware
29.
30.
31.

United States v. ISS Marine Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 129.
Barstow, supra note 24.
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code. 32 The purpose of seeking these materials was to see if the
shareholders could make out a potential fiduciary duty claim against
Wal-Mart’s management, a precursor to what might become a derivative
lawsuit. Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart claimed the materials were
protected by the privilege. In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the Chancery Court’s order, which forced Wal-Mart to produce
much of what the shareholders are seeking, including privileged
materials.33
Here, the privilege was trumped by a different doctrine. Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, a case decided back in 1970 by the Fifth Circuit.34 It holds
that under certain circumstances, shareholders may obtain access to the
company’s privileged documents. The Chancery Court further
determined that under Section 220, the shareholders have shown
essential need to execute a proper purpose, which is to determine
whether Wal-Mart’s management engaged in the kind of behavior that
would warrant a derivative lawsuit.
So, the current state of affairs is that the privilege is alive and well
but that atmospherics still matter. And, under the Garner doctrine,
shareholders may obtain access to documents that everyone agrees is
otherwise privileged.
So with the legal summary out of the way, let me get to the
normative question. What is the ideal privilege rule for corporate
investigations? That question is best answered by asking what is the
optimal corporate investigation? It strikes me that the ideal corporate
investigation is one that spends the company’s resources optimally. The
ideal corporate investigation is also one that conducts the investigation
in a legal manner. This is particularly the case for an international
investigation. And the ideal corporate investigation is one that identifies
and discloses criminal conduct properly and that enables the corporation
to learn from its previous mistakes.

32.
33.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW,
95 A.3d 1264, 1283 (Del. 2014).
34. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Now I am assuming that if you have a broad-based corporate
attorney-client privilege, two things happen. One is that the privilege
causes the corporation to hire and include more attorneys in the
investigation than it otherwise would. Two is that attorneys are, on
average, more costly to the corporation than non-attorney investigators.
Assuming those claims are accurate, how ought we to feel about the
privilege? If we are interested solely in optimizing resources, a noprivilege rule is better than a broad privilege rule because under a noprivilege rule, you still might hire attorneys, but you will not hire
attorneys just to secure the privilege.
With regard to optimizing disclosure, I would argue that the effect
of the privilege is more ambiguous than the Supreme Court and others
suggest. In terms of executing the investigation in a legal manner, there
is no question that it is better to have attorneys conducting the
investigation, and in terms of optimizing learning, one can assume that
attorneys improve the corporation’s behavior, particularly insofar as
they are able to identify incipient legal issues and enable the firm to deal
with those while they are still small.
To return to disclosure: it is extremely difficult to conclude that the
attorney-client privilege maximizes internal disclosure. If the attorney
conducting the investigation delivers what is commonly referred to as an
“Upjohn warning” wherein the attorney explains that the privilege
belongs solely to the corporation and the corporation maintains the sole
discretion to waive it, it is far from clear how such a rule maximizes
disclosure because the warning effectively communicates to the
employee that he has no legal protection whatsoever. Concededly, the
privilege may increase disclosure from the corporation to a government
agency or prosecutor, since an attorney in the boardroom will likely
draw upon his legal experience and expertise in arguing why the
corporation should disclose its wrongdoing to government authorities.
But in that case, the corporation’s reason for disclosure has fairly little
to do with the privilege, and is instead tied to its determination of
benefits that arise out of disclosure, as well as the costs that will ensue if
it fails to disclose and is caught anyway.
So, this discussion suggests three possibilities for the future. First,
we might conclude that there should be a privilege for all investigations,
since that would remove the impetus to populate an investigation
unnecessarily with attorneys. Presumably, that proposal would be dead
on arrival, since courts and commentators believe sincerely that the
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attorney brings something special and important to the corporate
investigation.
Aside from keeping the status quo (the second possibility), we
could also move to the opposite end of the spectrum and decide there
should be no privilege for any type of investigator, conducting an
internal corporate investigation. This option also seems doubtful, but it
raises an interesting question. Would the world really be so bad if we
did not have privilege for at least that part of the investigation that
focused on whether certain wrongdoing occurred? Keep in mind that
were courts to apply broadly the aforementioned Garner principle to
shareholder requests, this is the result we would likely reach.
Shareholders would routinely seek access to corporate investigatory
materials, and investigators (be they attorneys or non-attorney
investigators) would act accordingly. Would such a result reduce
internal disclosure or ultimately redound to the benefit of the corporate
shareholder? Perhaps we will learn the answer to this question when and
if shareholders more frequently seek materials pursuant to Section 220.
Through such activity, we might learn whether the corporate attorneyclient privilege truly benefits the shareholder by maximizing internal
disclosure and remediation, or in fact protects other constituents, such as
the corporation’s managers. Thank you.
STEVE THEL: Thank you, Miriam. I will take a few questions
from the audience, but first I will give the other panelists a chance to
comment on anything that anyone else on the panel said.
GEOFFREY MILLER: My question is for Miriam. The lower court
in the Upjohn case stated the idea, as we called it, that there should be a
privilege only for the control group, but not for ordinary line employees.
This idea sounds like the rather transient criticism you made of the
attorney-client privilege and of the fact that the conducts of compliance
are really applicable to the lower level employee, who does not
understand what is going on, and in any event is not protected by
privilege. Someone at the control group does understand what is going
on and probably has their personal interests aligned with the company a
lot more than, let us say, somebody who is on the ordinary line. We do
endorse the lower court opinion and Upjohn giving the privilege to the
control group.
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MIRIAM BAER: One problem that immediately creates is the issue
of defining who is in the control group. You will have litigation forever
about who is in the control group, particularly since a lot of companies
have changed and we do not necessarily have these hierarchical
structures involving the shop floor, the middle man, and then the senior
guy. That was the kind of company we imagined in 1980. Today, we
have a lot of flatter companies. I am not sure even that administratively
works so well.
I do not know because, on one hand, I do find that this disclosure
argument just does not work when you think about the lower level
employee. In fact, I am bothered by the fact that the lower level
employee might be talking to the lawyer because of a misperception,
meaning he is given an “Upjohn warning” and he does not hear it. What
he hears is, “Oh, is this a lawyer? Yeah, I can talk to him.” I think that is
something that should bother us if he ends up speaking simply because
of that misperception, although I must say that is exactly what happens,
speaking as a prosecutor. That is exactly what happens with Miranda.35
You have a police officer who gives a Miranda warning and someone
sits there and talks his head off thinking somehow it is good for him and
we get to benefit off of that.
I guess my answer to that is no; I would not endorse it only because
I am not sure that it works. However, I do agree that it seems to make
more sense in some ways to think about the control group as more
representative of the company. Normally, you think of the board
member as being aligned with the corporation when there is no actual
crime involved. I am not sure in the criminal context if the board
member is actually aligned. I am not sure if anybody should have
privilege is probably where I am going, which, as a lawyer, I find
admittedly unsettling.
GEOFFREY MILLER: Miriam, did you have a question?
MIRIAM BAER: I had a question for Sean regarding the disclosure
idea. Would it not be better if corporations disclosed a lot of stuff about
their compliance programs? Two questions for you. First, is there not a
risk that you are going to end up with the same problem that we have
seen in executive compensation, which is that it ends up being a big data
dump? It might even cause corporations to actually spend more, and
spend more unnecessarily, so it ends up being a best practices work
35.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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behavior, but not good behavior. Second, could corporations make a
legitimate argument that they do not want to reveal the stuff that really
works because that is a trade secret? Should compliance be protected as
a trade secret? Should we take the argument that compliance should be
protected as a trade secret seriously? If I spent a lot of money figuring
out what works, then I should get to keep the benefits for me.
SEAN GRIFFITH: Two great questions. The first one I had not
thought of; although, I do have this concept of compliance creep, which
is that we all will look at our peer companies and see what they are
doing. With regard to that concept, I suspect that it already occurs, so if
there is public disclosure, it will not cause more compliance creep
because I suspect that companies already look to the compliance
processes of their peer companies.
The trade secret question is an interesting one. If a company
actually discovered the secret sauce on how compliance actually works,
would the compliance details be in this public disclosure? My argument
on public disclosure is a derivative of a prior argument I made about
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance [D&O insurance]. Companies
have to disclose, in that context, premiums, retentions, and limits. That
would cause the capital markets to be able to see the gauge of
wrongdoing that D&O insurance is inside the company and that would
be good for capital market placing.
In this context, what are the metrics that we would want to force
disclosure in order to make compliance work better? I am not sure so I
cannot answer the second question because I do not even know what I
would ask them to disclose. The idea, I think, is that there ought to be
some sort of compliance variables that we would know about and that
assist the capital markets in gauging wrongdoing. What if they thought
that it was worthwhile to have separated the chief legal officer from the
chief compliance officer?
STEVE THEL: Thank you. We have time for a few questions from
the audience for the panel members. Any questions? We do have one.
Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me that you were pushing
more for no privilege in the context of investigations. Would that not
undercut what the attorney privilege idea or theory stands for? You
would expect that in the context of attorney privilege, people would be
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more forthcoming in terms of the investigation or at least seek advice
because that privilege is there? I am wondering, how do you juxtapose
that with no privilege for investigations in general?
MIRIAM BAER: Two things. One, when we are talking about no
privilege, I definitely would not suggest not having a privilege for, for
example, transactions or any kind of true ex-ante advice seeking. In
other words, if you are an attorney and I want to know in advance if we
are about to do this deal, and they are asking me to send the money to
this government officer’s wife, what do you think of that? I want a rule
that encourages me to come to you and ask that question and feel good
about asking that question. There is a very old paper by Louis Kaplow
and Steve Shavell that talks about when it comes to ex-ante advice,
privilege is good and socially desirable.36 We want to encourage it.
The problem with ex-post advice, after I have already done it, now
I come to you as an employee and I say, “Just so you know, I sent all
that money to the government officer’s wife, and I hid it in the following
way. I employed her as a consultant. What do you think about that?”
You are not going to say to me, “By the way, we have this great
privilege, and I am going to protect you, and all is well.” The most you
are going to say to me is, “I should let you know, it is the corporation’s
privilege.” If you are an ethically responsible attorney, you are going to
say, “It is actually the corporation’s privilege, and it is really up to the
corporation what we are going to do.”
In fact, based on everything we know, it is quite likely that you are
going to fire me, or you are going to give my name to the government,
or any of those things. I do not understand then, when we are talking
about ex-post behavior of what happened, how the privilege really gets
people like me, if I am the sort of person who did the bad thing, to
actually talk to you. Unless it is that I think that you are going to
somehow protect me and keep your mouth shut. If that is the case, that is
not socially desirable. That is where I am coming from.
STEVE THEL: Anyone else?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: To follow up on your question, I worked
in my career at CA, which is a rather large corporation. One of the
compliance function mottos was that you could report any wrongdoing,
totally anonymously. In fact, employees were specifically encouraged to
36. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961 (2001).
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report wrongdoing. I have a lot of comments, but I will just stick to this
one. Specifically, to go ahead and report anything because
confidentiality and privacy was going to be maintained if they did so did
seem to encourage employees to report wrongdoing. It was not that you,
yourself, necessarily engaged in the wrongdoing, although you could be
the one anonymously reporting, but there was a general feel that given
that statement, a lot more people would come forward, which they did.
As you said, in a 10,000 employee corporation, things did happen, not
all of them drastic. If that were to be taken away, clearly a lot less of that
would have occurred. So, can you comment?
MIRIAM BAER: No, I understand that, although I wonder with
your company whether someone made an actual statement along the
lines of, “By the way, I engaged in insider trading and I thought you
should know. Me and the gang are doing insider trading. Here is what
we have been doing.” I find it hard to believe that general counsel’s
office is saying, “That is fine. Thank you for letting us know. We will
investigate this, and since you came forward, you will have
confidentiality. We will never, ever remit your name to any authority.” I
can not believe that your company’s policy did not have some little
exception built in there that said, “Under certain circumstances, we are
going to have to reveal what you did criminally.” That seems unlikely to
me.
STEVE THEL: All right. I will ask you now to join me in thanking
our panelists.
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PANEL II: EVOLUTION: IMPACTING FINANCIAL SERVICES
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you all for coming back to the
second part of our program. I am Gerald Manwah, and Sean had
introduced me earlier on in the first session. I would like to introduce the
panelists for this session. To my extreme right, I will start with Allen
Meyer from Barclays, then Henry Klehm, followed by Martin Grant,
Alan Cohen, and Stuart Breslow.
I would like to start this off by asking the panelists to talk about a
couple of things that came out of this morning’s session, but also to give
their views in terms of the evolution of compliance with regard to a
number of defining moments over the last ten to fifteen years. As many
of you know, the regulatory landscape for compliance has changed
considerably. There have been a lot of defining moments over the last
ten to fifteen years. We all remember the events of September 11th. We
also recall the events of 2008 and the financial crisis. We have seen
censures in the financial services world that have gone beyond hundreds
of millions of dollars to now in the billions of dollars, and what I will
ask the panelists from my right, Stuart, going down, is to talk about how
have you seen compliance change, particularly with regard to the
reporting lines of compliance?
In many institutions in the past, compliance was part of the legal
function, but we are seeing a different, evolving model with regard to
the independence of compliance sometimes being associated with the
risk function, and more so, in some institutions, with part of the legal
department. Stuart, we will start with you, and we will go on to see what
models exist today, and what you think the future model will be.
STUART BRESLOW: I am the chief compliance officer of
Morgan Stanley. I guess I am the grand old man of compliance because
my perspective goes back more than fifteen years because I am two
months short of being the chief compliance officer for twenty years.
Having worked in compliance for some time now, and having begun at a
time when there were not many lawyers who were leading compliance
efforts, I have certainly seen the evolution over the course of the two
decades, and I do agree that over the course of the last six or seven years
there has been the greatest change in compliance.
I do report to the chief legal officer. I am a lawyer by training. I
spent eight years at Morgan Stanley as a litigator before the fickle finger
of fate pointed at me in April 1995, and I became the chief compliance
officer. What I often muse about is how to do somewhat the same job

36

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

for twenty years. My job has not been the same job for twenty years. I
became head of compliance for Morgan Stanley, the old investment
bank, with about five thousand employees. In 1997, we merged with
Dean Witter Discover, where I became head of compliance. In 2001, the
civil war that erupted found its way to me, and I moved to Credit Suisse
First Boston, and went to work as head of compliance for a Swissheadquartered organization, and, clearly, there is a very different
corporate ethos in a Swiss organization.
In 2005, Morgan Stanley was going down in flames because of a
bunch of legal regulatory issues. The CEO was caused to leave and John
Mack returned. The day he came back, he called me and asked me if I
wanted to rejoin. In 2008, we became a financial holding company
regulated by the Federal Reserve Bank. We also became a nationally
chartered bank regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
[OCC]. I do remember, and I am not so sure that Tom will remember,
but we came down on the Monday following our conversion to a
financial holding company. We put the application in on Friday, we got
it accepted on Sunday, which was not the usual course of affairs at the
Federal Reserve Bank, and on Monday morning a whole bunch of us
tromped down to the Federal Reserve Bank. We went down the row. I
was probably about eighth or tenth in the group, and Tom had not asked
me any questions at that point. He got to me, and Gary Lynch, the
general counsel, was introducing each of the people that were in the
room: the CFO, the chief risk officer, and down the line. Tom’s first
comment in that meeting was, “So who do you report to?” At that point,
I said, “I report to the chief legal officer. Are you okay with that?” He
said, “I am okay with that.”
We have since then re-validated that several times. Clearly, we are
in a growing minority, as housed within the legal department. I report to
the chief legal officer, who in turn reports to the chief executive officer.
I am on the firm’s management committee. He is on the firm’s operating
committee. We meet with the operating committee periodically. I meet
with the board independently. It has worked for us. We have had a
remarkably good run in the compliance space. I attribute it uniquely to
my genius in the space. I am joking, but we have had a very good run.
That is it in a nutshell. The other thing to note is in size. When I
rejoined Morgan Stanley in 2005, there was probably a fifty-fifty split

2016]

THE CHANGING FACE OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

37

between legal and compliance. There were 900 people in the group with
450 in legal and 450 in compliance. Now, we are about 1300 people.
Compliance is “to infinity and beyond,” in the words of Buzz Lightyear.
We continue to grow every year. That is us.
ALAN COHEN: I am older than Stuart is, but I have not been at it
as long. First I was an academic. If we go with the chief ethics officer, I
am probably the only guy on the panel with a PhD in political theory, so
I may qualify. I left being an academic, law school, and the rest, and
became a federal prosecutor for nine-plus years. Then I became a white
collar regulatory defense lawyer for twelve-and-a-half years. Then I got
the opportunity to join Goldman Sachs.
That was in 2004, after the firm, with the help of Boston Consulting
Group, completed a major study as to how to create an independent
compliance function. The firm was probably much smaller. Today, it is
roughly between 30,000 and 33,000 employees, but in 2004, a much
smaller firm decided that they needed to figure how to have a truly
empowered, independent compliance function. If I showed you all the
questions that were asked at the time, you would find the same questions
prevalent today, and in a lot of speeches by a lot of people on these
panels, and in other forums. The questions were, where should we
report? What should they look like? What are the right sizes, functions,
and the rest? When I came, as a result of that study and conversations, I
joined the management committee of the firm, which is the most senior
committee of the firm. It was at the time, say, twenty-plus people. It has
grown to thirty employees today.
I sit there, as do the general counsel, chief risk officer, the chief
financial officer, the heads of the operating divisions, and the rest. That
is a different model, concededly, than what Stuart has just described. I
report to the CEO. I have always reported to the CEO and have truly
unfettered access to the audit committee. Nearly each audit committee,
there is a presentation, but more importantly, before each audit
committee occurs, I am at the prep sessions with the board. There is
direct access and an ongoing dialogue with our board of directors as
well. That decision was made in 2004. I think that the structure for each
organization will be different, but for Goldman Sachs, that was the right
structure. When I got there, there were, call it, 200 to 300 full-time
employees in compliance, augmented by 50 to 100 consultants from a
variety of firms.
Fast forward to today, I will probably hit 950 people across the
globe. What has happened in the intervening years? It is marked by
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financial crises and other major disruptions in the city and in the world,
as well as in the capital markets. Just focusing on compliance, it is the
expectations of compliance that have so dramatically changed. I am sure
we will talk about it on the panel. The things I do, and the panel with
whom I work with today, are so radically different. Some of them are
the same, but the breadth and scope of those activities and the depth are
so radically different today that I can say that compliance has been
transformed several times throughout the period that I have seen it up
close and personal.
MARTIN GRANT: I am Martin Grant. I have to first issue a
disclaimer on my behalf and Tom Baxter’s behalf for his speech later
that the views we express are our own, and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. That
said, I started at the Federal Reserve Bank in 1990 as a banking lawyer,
became a litigator, and worked in enforcement for the first fifteen years
of my tenure at the bank.
In 2005, we began a compliance program with maybe three people.
This was after a study with Deloitte regarding whether we could benefit
from a compliance program and based on the guidance of our general
counsel, our audit committee, and our board of directors. We were also
thinking about Sarbanes-Oxley, and the failures of WorldCom and
Enron in the years before, and whether we could also impose some sort
of discipline on ourselves.
We are an organization transformed by the financial crisis. We
started at three, then became ten, and now have about forty-five
employees. We have made huge investments in technology. Much of
what we think about in terms of compliance is public integrity and
trying to perform intake measures that are consistent with regulatory
practice and that will ensure the public integrity of our organization. I
will stop there.
HENRY KLEHM: My name is Henry Klehm. I am a partner at
Jones Day. I started my legal career after an abbreviated business career
with the SEC. I spent ten years at the SEC in the enforcement section
here in New York before joining Prudential, now Prudential Financial,
in 1999. I spent three years there as the deputy general counsel, and then
six years at Deutsche Bank as the global head of compliance, before I
saw the light and got out of it. I went into private practice.
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With respect to the fundamental question of what is the optimal
organizational structure for compliance, when I got to Prudential, we
had just resolved, or were in the process of resolving, the first big
multistate settlement and some other issues involving limited
partnerships. It was obvious at that time that the compliance department
needed to be part of the legal department, primarily for reasons of
protecting privilege. It made a lot of sense.
Two-and-a-half years later, the then-general counsel absolutely
hated having compliance reporting to him and that got changed. He was
very much a lawyer and enjoyed the advisory part of being a lawyer and
the proactive counseling, but did not so much enjoy counting how many
policyholders had defects in their policy execution documents and
things like that. That is a microcosm of what I think has driven a lot of
organizational structure. That is to say, is compliance about being an
advisory function on a trading desk or is it about making sure that
everybody takes their anti-money laundering [AML] training every
year? Are we counting noses or are we counseling proactively on
transactions? I think when I was at Deutsche, talking about
organizational creep and other things, we went from 400 to 780
compliance people in six years, and that number is even higher today. A
lot of that related to increased regulatory obligations.
Since I have been in private practice since 2008, I probably
counseled thirty or forty of the Fortune 500 companies about
compliance programs. The answer, I think, is that it depends on what
works for your organization, the expectations of your board, your audit
committee, and the people that are involved. If the general counsel does
not want to deal with counting noses of how many people took AML
training, then he is probably not the right person to be doing that.
I know I have had some discussions with general counsels of major
financial institutions that are not here today, and right now, they are very
happy to not have compliance reporting to them because it is an
operations and systems implementation game. We are spending
enormous amounts of time developing and implementing global
surveillance systems, global training systems, and things like that, which
are not the core competencies of most people, other than Stuart Breslow,
who have law degrees.
I think that is the way of the future, and when I talk to public and
private companies not in the financial services sector about how to do
this, that is really what it is about. What do you want that function to be?
I know we are probably going to talk about what is effective
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compliance. I think that is a question that people have to answer before
they decide to whom your compliance officer is going to report.
ALLEN MEYER: My name is Allen Meyer, as Gerald reflected at
the beginning, and I work for Barclays. I have a group called Global
Compliance Services and Strategy, which is a bit of a mouthful. We call
ourselves GCS&S, and we are essentially the central utility for all of the
common parts of compliance. I will not get into the details of it, but I
will walk you through my background before that.
I have all sorts of interactions with other panel members going back
in my history. I was the global co-head of compliance at Credit Suisse,
and during some of that period at Credit Suisse, I worked with Stuart.
Before that, I worked at UBS, and before that, I worked as an
enforcement attorney at the SEC, where I bumped into my neighbor on
the left here quite a few times.
I have been in a senior compliance role since 1996, so I have, like
many of my panelists, been on the journey to where we are today and
where we are going in the future. It is simply going from the fringe to
the center. Compliance, whether you are talking about the reporting line,
investments, staffing, or stature within the organization, has continually
moved upwards for a period of time. Around the financial crisis, that
climb accelerated. The expectations were higher from the regulators.
The expectations of senior management and the attention paid by senior
management all grew over that period and uplifted quite dramatically
around the time of the financial crisis.
The reporting lines of compliance at Barclays changed a couple of
years ago to be directly to the CEO. The size of the department is 1200plus for compliance, excluding the AML population, which would bring
us to an overall number of about 2000 employees.
Addressing Henry’s point, I think it is both. It started, maybe, as an
advisory function where people sat on the trading desk from compliance
and advised on daily transaction flows. I think it is still a key component
to be at the table, being engaged with business people, knowing what is
going on, on a daily basis. But I also think the check and challenge piece
has become more important. There has been huge investment in it and
technology associated with it, and I think to get to where you are going,
and again, it is a continued evolution, you need to be working on both of
those and taking both of those to the next level.
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STUART BRESLOW: Look, we are all in financial services. I
think financial services is far more mature when it comes to compliance
than virtually any other industry. Maybe pharmaceuticals and aerospace
are comparable, but there has long been a structure for compliance in
financial services, so you see the numbers. We all have a thousand or so
people doing compliance. That is not ordinarily the case. I am sorry,
except for Martin, who has got three. It is a very different game in
financial services and it has led to a very robust set of programs.
Obviously, there is still some work to do, but it is very technologically
based with a lot of arms and legs doing the work.
GERALD MANWAH: On that point, Stuart and I will just ask a
few other people, in terms of if you were to look at industries outside of
financial services and pharmaceuticals, what do you think is the future
of compliance programs in large Fortune 500 companies? Especially, we
have seen an uptick in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act37 violations and a
number of things that everyone trying to build a compliance program is
doing. Do we see that there can be some benefits from learning from the
financial services group, in terms of building those compliance
programs? Alan C.?
ALAN COHEN: I’ll yield to Allen, the other Allen on the panel. In
my career before coming to Goldman Sachs, and since, I have seen
companies really across the economy. Pharmaceuticals and aerospace
are, if you will, the other highly regulated industries, though not nearly
as regulated except in the accounting and government contracting space.
Anybody who contracts with the government needs super high
compliance because getting that right is incredibly important. In
pharmaceuticals, it is much too easy to be crushed by running afoul of
those regulations.
The truth of the matter is, and again, I have seen this before, and
during my experience at Goldman, in companies we interact with, if you
are doing business in global markets you better have a very strong
compliance program because the world is a really complicated place. If
you are shipping, if you are going in and out of a port, or if you are
interacting in parts of the world where there are different expectations
around who gets paid for what, even if it is just a ministerial act, the

37. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012)).
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world in which we live has gotten very complicated as a money
laundering matter, as a bribery matter, and as a sheer compliance matter.
A case that I dealt with before I even came to Goldman Sachs,
towards the end of my private practice career, was a person who had
been indicted in China for providing meals to doctors who would come
into their tent basically on their break. The world and its laws is a very
complicated place. Even though this is a very United States-centric
panel, the laws around the world and around these very issues are
equally complex and sometimes inconsistent, but all need to be attended
to.
The UK Bribery Act38 may just be the easiest way to punctuate that
sentence. This Act is a UK law that effectively takes the United States
Government’s approach to governmental bribery and applies it broadly
to governmental and commercial bribery.
STUART BRESLOW: As a standard-setter in corporate nonprosecution agreements in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act space, we
have seen our group raided by Fortune 500 companies who are suddenly
looking for the secret sauce. That has been interesting to see, but we
have all attended meetings of compliance professionals of other
industries, and we go there, and we tell them that we have 850
employees in compliance or we have 950 employees. They say, “I have
four,” or “I have six.” Other industries have to learn. They have to really
understand it and embrace it, and not just because of bribery. There is a
whole set of corporate ethics you would be concerned about that others
do not seem to enforce and reinforce the way that we do.
To put it a little bit more generically, I think it is about the level of
legal risk that the enterprise is willing to withstand. As Alan said, if you
are dealing globally and internationally, you have to pay attention to
how you reconcile those regimes. It is no longer just about the financial
services industry. If you are an automobile company and you are
shipping parts internationally, there are a lot of opportunities for
mischief. Increasingly, the conversation involves whether you
understand the legal risks that are facing your company. The hardest part
of that for a person who has the two, three, or four people in his
38.

Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK).
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compliance department is looking ahead and saying we are doing this
business now, and we are shipping auto parts to Brazil and stuff like
that. Five years from now, what are the legal risks that are going to be
associated with that?
I think it is also reputational risk and regulatory risk. I think we
have seen so many cases of industrial corporations where there have
been very lax manufacturing processes because the cultures in those
organizations do not really understand the expectations of management.
That really does get communicated through the compliance groups.
ALAN COHEN: Pretty much every manufacturing company has an
embedded compliance function. It may not be a separate compliance
function that stands alone, but an embedded compliance function. You
just run through the list of activities you could get wrong. Think vitamin
manufacturers. They thought they were fine because they thought they
had the manufacturing process covered. They forgot that when people
went on the golf course, they could actually violate the anti-trust laws
pretty wantonly. The entirety of large United States companies and
global companies, Siemens, Daimler, and the rest, all have learned the
lesson that having strong compliance programs, and strong compliance
and value cultures, is of critical importance today.
MARTIN GRANT: The one thing I would say, though, is agreeing
with what everybody has said, I think that when you sit down with
people outside our industry, we always go in thinking we are really
special. It is really different, but the basic principles of what are the
rules and regulations, what are the polices that are articulated, how do
we train people on them, and what is the check and challenge to make
sure people are doing it, and it might be slightly different, but the
manifestation of who is doing the check and challenge, are really very
universal issues and universal challenges.
STUART BRESLOW: Yeah, but the concept of lists is not
relevant. I sort of disagree with that concept. I do think that every
organization has to have some document called a code of conduct that it
publicizes broadly to all of its employees. They know what the
organization expects of them and what they can be measured against.
There are a bunch of other things, whether it is an integrity hotline,
training program, policies and procedures, or things that, if you do not
have them, you look awfully unwise when there is a problem, not just
because the prosecutors are looking for it and you are looking for the
credit under the federal sentencing guidelines, but also because that
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reinforces a corporate ethos. It is really critical to the success of a
corporation.
GERALD MANWAH: Maybe I will just ask Martin. Because you
are in compliance within the Federal Reserve of New York, how do you
think that is consistent with other units within the Federal Reserve and
your counterparts, the OCC and the SEC, in terms of building internal
compliance programs like what you have built at the Fed?
MARTIN GRANT: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
combines a supervisory agency with an operating arm of a financial
institution. So while our colleagues in Washington write the rules and
guidance for the industry, we have to implement the best practices and
guidance internally. We have a lot of lessons that we learn by doing
what our colleagues broadly in the federal government have not
experienced. Starting with a code of conduct, we are all subject to the
same government ethics rules, but we have invested much more
significantly in an ethics program that is comprehensive and employs a
lot of people in order to make sure that our staff is knowledgeable, and
to ensure that they have all the tools to do well in the operation in their
day-to-day jobs.
GERALD MANWAH: I will pose these two questions to each
panelist that came out of this morning’s session. Should compliance
programs be treated as trade secrets or should there be public disclosure
on compliance programs? Just continuing the conversation from a
practitioner’s perspective, and I will start with you, Stuart, provide your
views with respect to more transparency in terms of those programs, and
maybe consistency and uniformity vis-à-vis your peers in other
industries that are highly regulated.
STUART BRESLOW: A least from the start, going back two
decades, we have always taken the view that compliance is not a trade
secret and that, in fact, the entire financial services industry suffers
when any of our peers suffer. We try to share best practices. Over the
years, Alan, Allen, and I have spent many hours together trying to figure
out the secret sauce, to the extent that there is one. I still remember when
I first took over the job back in 1995 that I spoke to peers in other firms,
and, without violating anti-trust laws, we took the view that, in fact, best
practices were important and we should all engage in them.
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We have lots of forums for doing that. We have always done that,
and I would never treat compliance as a trade secret. In fact, from my
perspective, the more we have industry standards, the better served we
are, so that we know that everyone is actually behaving to a similar
standard. The biggest problem we run into is when our employees say,
“They are doing this at XYZ Bank, why can we not do it here?” The
answer is that they really are not doing it at XYZ Bank, and if we all
knew that we had similar standards, we would be in better shape. I do
not see that one as a runner.
On the other question of disclosure, I thought the interesting point
there was that there would be more data to do more research on the
value of the programs. I thought that was interesting, although once you
get into the world of SEC disclosure and the quality of disclosure, I
think Sean is right; it becomes an issue of what is it that is being
disclosed. What is the format for doing it? What is the ability to generate
comparability around it? I would be in favor of it, but I just hope it does
not become another one of these exercises in routine disclosure.
GERALD MANWAH: Alan?
ALAN COHEN: I actually think that I have probably spent more
hours with these guys, and I am going to include Martin in some of this,
talking about best practices and how to do various aspects of the job that
we all do over the years. That has all been enormously helpful.
I will say that I think one of the places where the regulators broadly
could do a better job is, and I have made this point in one-on-one
conversations and I am not embarrassed or afraid to make it here,
drawing from the lessons that they learned by going across different
institutions and saying, “Here are some best practices, and here are some
things that we learned.” Every one of these institutions represented here
is entirely different. We all have different cultures. We are very much en
vogue when talking about institutions, but each one of the institutions
has a different culture.
We at Goldman, because of size, can have a partnership culture and
share those values through forums with all of our MDs, led by our
chairman. We can do that with all of our MDs and vice presidents. That
has been going on since I got there in 2004, although at the present, they
just keep rolling on different themes. We can do that because we are
32,000 people. You cannot do that if you are a couple hundred thousand
people. You can articulate values and train people in those values
broadly, but how you go about it will have to be different. I use that just
as an example of what are the best practices around modified and
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adapted for different institutions. What are the best practices around
surveillance? Or insider trading? Every institution has insider trading
risk.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Need a lawyer?
ALAN COHEN: The most useful thing I remember the SEC
publishing recently was when Steve Cutler went around and did the
conflicts review in…?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: October 2003.
ALAN COHEN: Even though he promised to do so, he left
beforehand, but subsequent to that, on different rounds, we have had
some best practice documents. I actually think that disclosure from our
respective institutions will never be good enough to actually be much
helpful to the investing community, in my humble opinion, given its
nature. We need a lot more disclosure by our regulators around best
practices, the ability to go in and see what happens in different
institutions. One of the best documents, and I recommend it to you, is
the senior supervisory group review that came after the financial crisis.
Global regulators went into institutions across the world that were
impacted by the crisis and, concealing their names, they talked about the
different things that worked well and did not work well at different
institutions leading up to and during the financial crisis. Incredibly
important, penetrating documents around risk management, compliance,
control, governance, and the rest.
MARTIN GRANT: I had somewhat of a counterpoint on
developing communities of practice in that ethics and compliance
professionals have organized themselves in associations and those
associations have grown tremendously. There is tremendous sharing. I
think they could be more supported by large organizations. The second
thing is that consulting firms have partnered with some publications to
develop surveys so that there is some amount of information sharing. It
may be at too high a level for the kind of world that Sean is talking
about in terms of measures of effectiveness that can be used by
shareholders.
HENRY KLEHM: I guess the reason I am in private practice is
because I am the skeptic on all of this. First, on the issue of trade secrets
and benchmarking, and sharing all of that information, it is great if you
are right in the middle of that pack. If you are at the bottom of the pack,
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your regulator is saying, “Klehm, why haven’t you got more resources?”
If you are at the top of the pack, your management is saying, “Klehm,
you are way too expensive.”
It gets very difficult to have a principled conversation. The reason
we are different is we have people in forty-two different countries, and
the people that you are comparing me to have people in twenty or ten
countries. The benchmarking, trade secret issue, I think, becomes very
difficult. I do think, to Martin’s excellent point, there are lots of
societies, such as SIFMA, the Institute for International Banking, and
the American Bankers’ Association, that I think are ideal formats for
sharing that kind of stuff.
With respect to the best practices and promulgations by regulators,
I agree with Alan that the Senior Supervisory Group report was
fantastic. The problem that I see a lot of times though, when you know
the underlying facts of some of this, is that fact gets a little lost in
aspiration. The regulators have an agenda that they are trying to drive. It
is very difficult. Even if they do not, sometimes boards or senior
management have a skeptical view of that and so they are going to take
that with a grain of salt.
With respect to the disclosure idea, the public disclosure idea, I
guess my first question is, disclose what? We have seen in the wake of
Dodd-Frank, the enhanced risk disclosure required in registration
statements and 10-Ks, and proxy statements about Compensation
Disclosure and Analysis, and the like. What I see happening a lot on the
private practice side is people managing to the disclosure, which is not
thinking necessarily what is the best for our organization, but how do I
disclose it in a way that makes me look just look like everybody else.
To me, the proof of that was, believe it or not, when that rule first
went into effect, CVS’s parent, Caremark, was the only company that
year to disclose that it thought that its compensation systems drove
inappropriate risk-taking by management. Of course, the next year it
was gone. That had changed, and nobody that I am aware of has a
disclosure saying, “Our compensation system drives too much risk.” It
just does not happen. People will morph to the disclosure standard in a
way that, I think, over time becomes somewhat counterproductive.
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you. Allen?
ALLEN MEYER: Being the last guy in the line sometimes has its
disadvantages, having not much left to say that has not been said. But
other than just as a practitioner, the more sharing best practices and
lessons learned from the industry, whether from the regulators or among
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ourselves, has a huge value. As a senior compliance leader, you are
coming in every day asking how to do it better. You have the changing
regulatory landscape, the latest thing in the newspaper that happened to
a peer firm. It is the absolute challenge for us in senior leadership
positions and compliance to keep evolving. You do not have a lot of
time or money to make mistakes and chase down blind alleys.
Generally, the direction of travel should be sharing and transparency,
but I guess there are a lot of issues in terms of how to effectuate that.
GERALD MANWAH: Over the last few years, there has been a lot
of evolving thoughts and changes in terms of what is known as the lines
of defense. Who owns the first line of defense for a large corporation, an
entity or highly regulated financial services company, especially when
they are global in nature? With respect to the first line of defense, the
second line of defense, the third line of defense, and the independence of
the compliance function, there is a lot of discussion about the culture of
firms.
What I would like to get from each of the panelists is your thoughts
on organizations, particularly large organizations, having a culture.
What does that mean today, especially with the evolving regulatory
environment and regulatory expectations? Maybe I will do it in the
reverse order, Allen M., so that you can speak first?
ALLEN MEYER: I guess I walked into that. I think there has been,
for financial institutions, a lot of focus over the last few years on the
overall risk management framework, which has a lot of implications.
Going back to my comment before, there is a lot to do. There is a lot to
do for operational risk. There is a lot to do for the compliance
department—the first line of defense. Everything is changing. I think it
is a great value to define your overall risk management framework. Who
is doing what? What is the borderline between the compliance function
and the operational risk function and the market risk function and the
credit risk functions? That is sort of worth doing. What are the
borderlines? Who is responsible for what? That is across the horizontal
axis. The vertical is really the first line, which is business, people that
run businesses, and their responsibilities. Second line is the risk
functions. The third line is usually internal audit. I think it is also
worthwhile to sort of clarify the vertical axis. Addressing what is the
first line of defense’s responsibility and ensuring they are responsible
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for managing that risk across that waterfront. You have problems when
they do not feel like they own it. They are waiting for compliance to tell
them what to do. While you can never tease it out to “What do I do this
day?,” if you are sitting in one of those chairs, a business chair, or a
second line of defense compliance type chair, it is worth setting out,
clearly, roles and responsibilities and making sure people understand it.
It is when it is not clear when things start going wrong.
HENRY KLEHM: I think in terms of organizational culture, every
large organization on the planet is ultimately driven by how people at
the top of the organization are compensated. What are the key metrics or
the key performance indicators about how they are compensated? If
there is a perception that my friend, Allen here, is in a second-tier
function, and therefore is compensated in a different way, or on a
different grid, then the frontline function is taking business risk, or
theoretically taking real business risk, not legal risk. There is going to be
a natural stature issue there.
I think it is a very challenging thing for a board to look across an
organization and think about how to put everybody on the same grid.
The fact is you are all supposed to be doing different things, whether
you are the first or the second or the third line of defense. When you get
into that nomenclature that I know everybody is into right now, I think it
really starts to say, “I am a tier-one guy. Therefore, I count more, and
my compensation should reflect that.” What does the tier-two guy have
to say about your compensation? What does the tier-three guy have to
say about your compensation? How are those measures put back into
that? That will have the biggest impact overall on organizational culture.
The other thing I will say is everybody talks about the Johnson &
Johnson credo that has been around forever, and has only had very
minor modifications. 39 It is worth reading that story, and it is worth
understanding the whole Tylenol thing, and how that fit together
because that is a true issue.40 The leader of the organization, at a critical
point in time, was willing to take zero risk. He did not take profit risk on
39. See JOHNSON & JOHNSON, OUR CREDO, http://www.jnj.com/sites/default/files/p
df/jnj_ourcredo_english_us_8.5x11_cmyk.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VKC-ZTR7]; Our
Credo Values, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo
[http://perma.cc/AX5G-72M8].
40. See Jennifer Latson, How Poisoned Tylenol Became a Crisis-Management
Teaching Model, TIME (Sept. 29, 2014), http://time.com/3423136/tylenol-deaths-1982/
[http://perma.cc/3D4L-TQS7].
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this at all. He put the potential consumers of Tylenol absolutely first
regardless of how that panned out for the organization. That is an
extraordinary leader. It takes an awful lot of guts to do that. When you
have a leader that is willing to do that, or Jack Welch, who used to have
the 9-blocker at GE, which was a miserable day or two for everyone in
the operating businesses, when he, the head of internal audit, the head of
legal, the head of compliance, and the head of HR sat down people and
went through all the metrics of their business organizations on all of
these kinds of things. You have got to have that type of engagement
from the top to do that. When you get into a huge organization like WalMart, with 2,000,000 employees, it is even more difficult to do.
MARTIN GRANT: We have been thinking about culture a very
long time. We have been aided by people like the late Rush Kidder, and
he always says that the culture is the stories that organizations tell about
themselves. In the story of Johnson & Johnson and the story of WalMart, the leaders’ actions matter as do their words. Incentive structures
matter as do the risk appetites of firms, so they can be organized in a
way, and it has to do with the leaders of the organization stressing and
emphasizing that compliance is everybody’s responsibility. Good
behavior is everybody’s responsibility.
There are lines of defenses. The business people are often at the
first line, and they have responsibilities to escalate issues and seek
advice from both lawyers and compliance professionals as the matters
arise. There is a role for everybody. While there is a lot of line tending,
like this is our risk management responsibility or a control
responsibility, I think the more organizations stress that good conduct is
everybody’s responsibility, and escalation is a key part of it, I think
organizations are going to be better off. I will leave it there.
ALAN COHEN: I actually agree with what these guys said. I do
think often the conversations are on lines of defense. This is Martin’s
point, which is that everyone in the organization must agree on what
those values are. We set out fourteen. John Whitehead, who passed
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away yesterday, had fourteen business principles that basically laid out
the values of the firm that our firm has tried to live by.41
After 2008, we went through great soul searching around those
values, and did a lengthy report with a series of seventy-nine
recommendations to reinvigorate and give very concrete action steps
around them, but that was a report of the firm. The ownership and
execution of those action items as well as those principles belongs to the
firm, driven from the top. I talked earlier about having the chairman of
the firm sit down in groups of MDs and VPs. Unless the shared values
are, one, articulated, and, two, become owned by the senior
management, there is a risk that this lining up of defenses says, “I do not
have to worry about that. That is her job.”
I think unless people—and we have actually changed the charters
of every one of our committees—unless everybody understands that
everyone’s job is reputational risk and protecting the firm, there is a risk.
I think it is a risk that people will say compliance is the ethics officer’s
job because that is who is supposed to stand up and say, “That is
unethical.” You have to make sure that the values and the principles that
the firm has agreed to live by are well understood and embedded, along
with the consultation process and the review process, and the rest. Then
the question is, what does compliance have to do with that? Guess what?
Compliance at Goldman Sachs gets asked whether Sally should be
promoted. Is there a reason Sally should not be promoted? Has Mary
engaged in conduct that should be taken into account in connection with
her compensation this year? What are the review scores? Unless you
embed it throughout, there is this risk with lines of defense that it
minimizes different people’s roles when they should be shared roles.
STUART BRESLOW: Going back to Sean’s comments earlier that
if compliance were as omnipotent as he would have it be, and we have
subsumed and subverted all corporate governance, I quibble with Allen
on the three lines of defense. What compliance does is it facilitates and
oversees compliance by the organization. Going to Martin’s point,
compliance is everybody’s job. It is not just the compliance
department’s job.

41. See Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Business Principles, GOLDMAN SACHS,
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/business-principles/inde
x.html [http://perma.cc/D72C-WS55].
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The mistake would be that we are compliance or ethics housed in a
group of you guys. You are the ethical conscience of the organization—
you and you alone. What the first, second, and third lines of defense
have really done is made clear to the business lines that they are first and
foremost. It is their business. They are transacting. They are on the line.
They have to make sure that it gets done right every day. “If they have
questions about it, come see us. By the way, we will be watching them
to make sure they do it, and internal audit will be watching us to make
sure that we do it.”
I do agree too that these are not philanthropic organizations. People
go to work for financial services to get paid money. I guess that is a real
surprise for most of you in the room, but people actually get paid to
work at these places. We look at people who have done bad things. We
try to figure out whether or not they should have their compensation in
some way, shape, or form docked. We also are very much involved in
the annual evaluation process. We look at employees who have low
scores on their annual evaluations in their ethics and compliances
competencies that are rated. We too have the same sort of partnership
culture, a little bit further removed from Goldman Sachs, as we went
public in 1986, but at the core of Morgan Stanley is an old partnership.
I still remember when I was at Credit Suisse and the Morgan
Stanley regime was going down in flames in 2004. My colleagues were
saying, “You seem to care. Why do you care?” The answer was because
I had been there for so long, and those of us who were there and were
members of the partnership really cared passionately about it, not the
same way you care about it if you are at a Swiss organization, or
perhaps even a German organization, or even some of the larger UK
banks. In our world, we were partners and it mattered passionately to us.
In the end, when that regime went down in flames, we saw it coming
and we knew it was going to happen.
MARTIN GRANT: I think the main point though is that values and
culture are essential. You can have the best compliance department in
the world, the greatest risk management structure in the world, but if the
values and culture are not there, then it is going to be very difficult.
STUART BRESLOW: Our elevator speech is not, no offense,
fourteen points. It is a first class business in a first class way, as the
people who are the true successors to the J.P. Morgan legacy say very
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simply and very straightforwardly, and we have four very simple points
that have been our expositions of that. It is very clear to all employees
what is expected of them.
GERALD MANWAH: I will ask the panel now a number of things
because I am mindful of the time, and we would like to open up the
floor for a few minutes so that people can ask questions. I will ask a
number of things in one question.
In terms of the challenges for compliance for the future, we have
seen the demands for compliance officers far exceeding the supply of
people who are trained in the space. We also see the importance of
technology, but not whether or not the investment in technology gives
you the bang for your buck, and whether it is consistent across the board
in terms of its effectiveness. We have also seen a trend to looking at
behaviors and practices. What causes people to behave badly? When
you look at some of the regulatory censures, it is not an organization
filled with 300,000 employees that are all culpable. It is a small group of
people that are actually doing some bad things. Of course, that
corporation is liable and pays these hefty fines, as we have seen the
criminal actions in some of the recent cases with Credit Suisse and BNP
Paribas. The future of compliance is based on this landscape, and I will
just ask the panelists to talk about where they see compliance as
evolving based on some of these challenges. Stuart, I will start with you.
STUART BRESLOW: Challenges. I think the Federal Reserve has
it right. One of the big questions is, how do we ever demonstrate
program effectiveness? That remains for me the holy grail. We have all
kinds of performance metrics. We have the things we do. We do make
sure that every employee at the firm, from James Gorman on down,
acknowledges their code of conduct every year. We do make sure that
every employee from James Gorman on down does his anti-money
laundering training and other training that we get around to the firm. We
do have our metrics around surveillance and testing, but in the end, do
we know if we have an effective program? We have not figured that out
yet. We do know we have a program in size. We just cannot definitively
demonstrate that it is effective. We do know that for purposes of the
federal sentencing guidelines we have a program that ticks all the boxes.
We have had independent law firms come in and validate that for us. We
do know how our size compares to others because we have had
consultants come in and do that for us. We have had horizontal reviews
by our regulator. We know where we stack up that way. In terms of
whether we have made that impact on the organization that is
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demonstrating effective culture, we do not know, but we do know that
we have a strong culture at its base.
Second thing is that there are a lot of jobs for compliance
professionals right now. The number, and I am looking at the HSBC
results a couple of weeks ago, is ten percent of their 258,000 employees
are in risk and compliance associated with anti-money laundering.
Where do you find those people? What do you do with them? How do
you make sure they are doing their jobs properly? If it is tough here in
the States, it gets tougher in Europe, and even tougher in Asia. We run a
global business and it is very hard to find qualified staff, but we are
doing the best we can. We have all been hiring a lot of young people,
both young graduates of colleges and young graduates of law school,
and train them up. Finding the bodies to do that is very difficult.
ALAN COHEN: I agree with what Stuart said. We all have the core
elements and beyond in each one of them, whether it is certifications,
training, a lot of focus on culture, and the rest, or in the job of
preventing and detecting the firm, engaging in combat that would
violate rules, cause reputational damage, or in other ways result in a bad
impact. I think only results tell us that. The reason I say that only results
tell us that is because if nothing ever happened in the world, you would
say your compliance programs were perfect. It may or may not be true,
but oftentimes, when bad things do happen, there is a strong compliance
program over here that missed what happened over there. It did not
ignore it. More often than not, it was not that someone knew it was
going on. In those instances, it was just egregious, and that falls into my
bad people will do bad things category. People miss things.
If you read the conversations that come out around LIBOR, as an
example, those conversations which occurred in chat rooms lead me to
not ask whether there are effective programs. We have effective
programs, but they are not perfect. They cannot be. They will miss
things. What I actually worry about going forward is how to get better at
finding where the problems are that I otherwise will have missed.
That goes to your technology question. Every month, every year,
there are a billion e-communications that occur at Goldman Sachs. How
do I find that chat, or series of chats, associated with prices? In some
cases, it is voice. In some cases, it is electronic communications. I need
to associate that data with a market price, maybe with a voice
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conversation and maybe with better knowledge as who the
conversations are between and among and the rest. How do I get a better
view of that? In order to do what? In order to find instances where I
should be preventing bad behavior, or knowing that it is not bad
behavior. How to do a better job of that? That goes to the crush of
compliance talent.
Tentatively, I am not so sure, to go back. I am not sure what the
return on investment is on hiring thousands and thousands of new
graduates to look at account opening documents. We might be better off
hiring thousands and thousands of technologists who could actually
figure out how to find the money launderer, or the person who is
engaging in misconduct. We have not gone that way, in large part,
because nearly most of these settlements have resulted in people staffing
up in easy—and it is hard to staff up—or in easier ways than solving the
problems that I am worried about, which is how to find potential
misconduct and stop it. I think that is one of the greatest challenges.
STUART BRESLOW: Just by way of comparison, we have
3,000,000 e-communications a day at our organization that occur
globally. I think we are all in the same boat in this in terms of trying to
use big data providers, the guys who figured out the Boston bombers,
and tried to pull together lots of information from lots of different data
sources within the organizations.
ALAN COHEN: Just to take away, a billion emails? Every month
we record, if you played it end to end, ten years’ worth of voice.
STUART BRESLOW: Although it is digitized now.
ALAN COHEN: It is digitized, but the United States Government
cannot even record that well.
MARTIN GRANT: I was going to talk about smaller challenges:
onboarding new staff and the importance of training and education on
the culture. How do you make sure that the people who join your
organization share your values and understand the key message? That is
a core challenge. A lot of institutions find it a good thing for many
junior staff, at least in trading desks, to have dialogue about misconduct,
to the extent that you can get them early on the company culture and
values.
HENRY KLEHM: I am going to go from that to very high-level
observation. I think globalization of business transactions poses a
number of risks that make the life of compliance very difficult. I think
one of the biggest challenges, and you can look at the emails in the BNP
case or you can go back to see when Alan C. was doing anti-trust
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defense, is developing in a global organization mutual respect for all
countries’ laws and regulations, and how they are enforcing them. That,
I think, is a very big challenge. I think if the BNP executive that had
written the incredibly unfortunate email had really appreciated the
seriousness with which the United States Government takes that
conduct, I think he would have had a far different outcome. How
compliance can convey that in a multicultural organization, and I know
that some of us have worked for organizations with Germanic or Swiss
roots, is a huge challenge, particularly if the systems are really rooted in
different notions of what a corporation exists for.
I know here, despite what Professor Griffith said earlier, that
corporations still do exist for the benefit of the shareholder. I think the
European view, or the Germanic view, that the corporation exists to
better society, lead to vastly different value systems around how you do
that. Getting multinational businessmen to understand that you have to
respect United States law the same way the French expect me to respect
data protection law when I am doing business in France is an enormous
challenge for compliance.
ALLEN MEYER: I am going to even take it at a higher level than
Henry. I think the challenge is like the big bang theory. The universe
just keeps expanding, and us, as compliance professionals, keep trying
to contain something that continues to grow indefinitely. I think the
challenge is to, and I think Alan sort of alluded to it, work smarter,
whether you have to come up with different ways of looking at hiring
and onboarding compliance talent and training them or better uses of
technology where we are looking for detection of a bad actor rather than
just compartmentalizing a person sitting all day, looking for one type of
word or something like that that comes in our lexicon. How do we use
our resources, which we have continued to grow with the greatest
leverage at the points of the most impact in the organization, to impact
in the culture? Trying to take away from the daily flow of challenges
that come at you and sort of continue to return back to being strategic,
how do you work smarter and have more impact?
GERALD MANWAH: Thank you all. At this point, we would like
to open up the floor for questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is a lot of talk about culture and it is
salutatory. It strikes me though that it is also ex-ante. If you have an
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adult employee whom you have to teach integrity to, is it too late?
Maybe there should be more of a focus on hiring practices? I am not
saying you have to hire all Eagle Scouts who believe in God and love
the United States uniformly, although maybe that would be good, but is
there an ability to emphasize employment practices and who you are
hiring if you have to teach them culture? For example, if there is a law
against it or not, I am not going to trade with the enemy of the United
States, but it seems that some of your organizations have problems
where people not only do not recognize that there is a law, but they need
a law to tell them not to do it.
MARTIN GRANT: I was thinking about hiring practices. Issues
around grade inflation in college and that everybody is great, and when
they come to work that they all want to be great, and then, especially
with trading floors, your performance is measured every day. Will
people look for an edge? How do you prevent that? Did they in their
past life? It is hard to tell. “You cannot do that here,” is something that
you want to emphasize and stress. I do not know if there is a great
failing in moral education in America, but we do see incidents, repeated
incidents, of misconduct by fairly junior people.
ALAN COHEN: I am going to separate your two points just to
start. I actually think there is enormous focus on hiring people who are,
in fact, ethical, moral, great in their job, and the rest. I think it is a bit of
a straw man that you set up on that one. The amount of time that is spent
on that is enormous. That being said, nobody can get that perfectly. That
would be point one.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Straw man? Nobody mentioned it except
to the gentlemen to your right.
ALAN COHEN: The reason I think it is a straw man is I think you
should know that the amount of time that is spent in hiring people who
are the right people for the job, both by talent and temperament, is
basically enormous. I think it is like thirty interviews before somebody
ends up getting a job at most of these places. There is no litmus test that
anyone has found for someone who, notwithstanding shared values in a
place, will not lie, cheat, and steal. Guess what? In any town of 100,000
people, somebody will do that even if everybody around them is telling
them not to. West Point is an example. A lot of Eagle Scouts, but they
have a lot of cheating. I was an Eagle Scout, by the way, just for the
record. It happens in places where you would have certified to the
culture, and we, because we are on the detective side, are still spending
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enormous amounts of time trying to find the people who,
notwithstanding that we thought would do the right thing, do not always.
ALLEN MEYER: People do not always tell the truth. That is the
bottom line. I think when people are under stress over a protracted
period of time to, let us say, make the trading profit or something like
that, I think it is virtually impossible in a hiring scenario to determine
when somebody is going to be willing to cut a corner.
STUART BRESLOW: Beyond that, making sure you have clear
guidance to all employees what you expect of them is no different than
saying to a first-grader, “Here is what we expect of you.” There is no
doubt about what is expected of every employee of the organization
straightforwardly, and setting up cultural norms and behavioral norms
for the organization, and if people get out of line, then they punished for
it. The harder part is that you incentivize the good behavior, and
demonstrate the incentivization of the good behavior, which is another
thing we struggle with within this organization.
ALAN COHEN: I think there is a regulatory problem here as well.
This is not so much in the United States, but outside the United States
where people leave one firm and go to another firm, you will never
know whether the person who you hire has left the other firm. Certain
regulators around the world, I am being slightly careful here, actually
receded, in my view, from their obligation to collect that information
and disseminate it. There have been a lot of incidents. I will bet we can
compare notes on this panel where people have left each of our firms for
cause, in substance, and have been hired by the next firm with
knowledge of the supervisory authorities that that was going on. I think
that is probably something that people ought to be addressing as well.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Following up on that, it strikes me that
there are two types of groups that, if you were in compliance, you would
be most worried about. One is what you might call the meticulous
planner. This is like the bad guy who plans out his wrongdoing from day
one, and because he knows he is engaging in wrongdoing, he covers his
tracks. That is really the hard guy to find.
Then the other type of person, which I imagine is more prevalent, is
the falls-into-it guys. He falls prey to temptation. There is something
right there, and he is under pressure, and he takes that thing, that magic
thing that is hanging there when he should not. It strikes me that there
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are different ways that you might want to respond differently to the
meticulous planner than you would to the fall-prey-to-temptation. Is that
something that you have thought about in your respective practices?
Where you say to yourself, “We are not necessarily going to worry so
much about the Bernie Madoff, who may be in our firm, but we are
worried about the guy who falls off the wagon.”
ALLEN MEYER: I think it is a great way to ask the question. I
think, through the panel, we have been thinking about both of those
people. The second one, the inadvertent drifter into misconduct, that is
really about culture and making clear what the firm expects of you.
Having compliance, having a powerful role, and them understanding
that drift to get an edge is not acceptable. That is a cultural point. I think
the second point when we talk about surveillance and detection, we are
evolving that, trying to listen to voice and electronic communications
and marrying it together with trade data. That is sort of the detection
one, where we are stepping up on both levels at all of our firms, taking
them both seriously.
ALAN COHEN: We need to figure out what in the world it looks
like. It is really hard to get into people’s heads to figure out whether
they are thinking they are the meticulous planner or the opportunistic
actor. Since I know I cannot largely get into their head, I can tell them,
make sure they understand what the value proposition is and what the
expectations are, but after that, accepting the two categories, I am trying
to figure out what it will look like. What the aberrational conduct would
look like just as fast as I can. I cannot prevent it. I have stipulated that
based on these two cases, but I want to be able to know what that little—
in the sea of data—what that little blip is going to look like when either
one of those motivations leads somebody to do something that is beyond
the norm.
How do I know that? How fast can I know it? I am not going to be
able to get into their head. I have had people. There is some great
technology out there, where people have come to us and have said, “I
can tell you, just by listening to their voice or analyzing their emails,
who is the disgruntled employee.” Everybody that has had a disgruntled
employee in the room should be laughing right now, because it never
happens. I said, “Here is a test. I am going to give you a bunch of
voice.” I have done this. I said, “Here are two terabytes of voice. Tell
me who is disgruntled. I happen to know one who is in the pot.” Nobody
has told me. I keep hoping that somebody will do that because then I
have lots of digits for them to look at.
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HENRY KLEHM: I think it is almost a dichotomy because the end
result is the same. If you think back to a case that Alan and I have spent
a lot of time on. Joe Jett had problems with other firms and tumbled to
Kidder Peabody, and realized that this was his last shot at Wall Street.
He saw an aberration in the computer system, which he then exploited to
the extreme. It is not like he went in there knowing that that aberration
existed. He spotted it and then engaged in a course of conduct over
eighteen months that was devastating ultimately to the firm. I think all
you could see at the end was the classic rogue trader.
GERALD MANWAH: Anything anyone else wanted to add? Did
we have any more questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We heard from Professor Miller earlier
this morning about trying to figure out, with all his equations, what the
most efficient spend on compliance is. My question to you is, how does
regulatory pressure affect that spend? I think what he was trying to say
earlier was that firms will try to spend the optimal amount of money, but
how true is that or how exactly can that happen when there is extreme
pressure from regulators to actually beef up or do other things for
departments?
HENRY KLEHM: I think, if I remember correctly, he was talking
about probability and the size of the fine. I think the pressure from the
regulators increases the probability. I think the impossible, in his
equation and in my mind, was predicting the fine. I think if you looked
at AML enforcement in 2008, I do not think anybody would have
predicted an $8 billion fine. I think there were other externalities, for
example the advent of the Department of Financial Services, that wound
up driving that fine to an incredible level. Looking back at the conduct,
we now see what it is. I thought it was an interesting idea. I think it is
virtually impossible to do.
GERALD MANWAH: Anyone wanting to add anything? If not, I
would like to thank all of the panelists for their contribution this
morning. We will now move on to the next session. Sean is going to
introduce the next speaker.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS42
SEAN GRIFFITH: It is my great honor and pleasure to introduce
Tom Baxter from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Tom Baxter
is the general counsel and executive vice president of the legal group at
the New York fed. He has also served as deputy general counsel of the
Federal Open Market committee. Mr. Baxter supervises the day to day
operations of the New York Fed’s legal group which includes the
Federal Reserve’s law enforcement unit, the corporate secretary’s office,
the compliance and ethics function, the banking applications function.
He also serves in the bank’s management committee. Mr. Baxter, as you
may know, has published many books, many articles, relating to legal
aspects of banking, as well as a number of important articles in what
works well and what we should be doing different in compliance. So, it
is my great pleasure to turn the podium over to Tom Baxter.
THOMAS BAXTER:
Let me begin by thanking Professor Sean
Griffith, the director of the Corporate Law Center, and Robert Lyons,
editor of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, for
inviting me to participate in this symposium about corporate compliance
and corporate governance. Let me also thank Fordham Law School for
hosting the symposium. I would also like to recognize a colleague who
is with us today. He is Martin Grant, who is the New York Fed’s chief
ethics and compliance officer. I have had the privilege of working with
Martin for the last twenty-five years, and much of what I have learned
about compliance I have learned from him.
In the space sometimes labeled compliance, we have come a very
long way in a relatively short time. In about twenty years, compliance
has transformed from a nice idea to an important component of most
major corporations. This is especially true in the highly regulated
industries, including the industry where I have made my career,
financial services. We could spend much time discussing how this
transformation happened. From my vantage point, it happened because
of the combined effects of the Federal sentencing guidelines, the
Delaware Chancery Court’s Caremark decision, 43 and the post-Enron

42. The views expressed by the speaker are his own and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
43. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Lit., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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legislation known as Sarbanes Oxley. 44 Of course, other events also
fueled the transformation, and in the financial services industry, the
worst financial crisis our country has seen since the Great Depression
became a burning platform.
While it is always important to look back at the road traveled, I am
not going to spend any more time on that particular topic. Instead, today
I intend to look forward at where compliance is going, and to forecast
for our future some things we should pay attention to now. I will discuss
five different items, and I predict that some of the greatest
accomplishments for compliance are not in the recent past but in the nottoo-distant future. If we plan ahead, and if we can successfully adapt to
changing circumstances in our respective industries and in the national
and global economies, then twenty years from now you will listen to
another keynote speaker remarking on further amazing progress for the
compliance profession. In short, we are on our way to another level.
Most of my remarks today will be devoted to the things that I
believe will get us to the next level. Let me turn to them now.
The nomenclature that is used in compliance to describe the
company officer responsible for compliance has changed, and the
change in nomenclature is a clue to revealing a material, substantive
change. Twenty years ago, we called this officer the “compliance
officer”, and I emphasize the singular. Over several years the title
morphed, as compliance programs developed and compliance jobs
multiplied, both with respect to subject matter expertise and the types of
skill sets needed to make compliance programs “take”. Consequently,
companies found that the compliance officer turned into the chief
compliance officer, because in major companies, it took a village to get
compliance done. Compliance, you see, turned from singular to plural.
More recently the title has again changed. In many companies
today, the title is chief ethics and compliance officer, or CECO,
reflecting a salutary trend on the part of many companies to integrate
ethics and compliance. Why is this happening? In my view, it is
happening in recognition of the fact that it is easier to have an effective
44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)).
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compliance program in a company that nurtures a strong ethical culture.
In a recent speech, Daniel Tarullo, a governor of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, accurately observed that “culture” is a
“somewhat contested academic concept.”45 Yet, the evidence is growing
that an ethical culture produces tangible benefits, including making
compliance more effective.
Recent studies attempting to assess the effectiveness of compliance
programs have developed a measure called the “PEI”, or Program
Effectiveness Index. Early work with the PEI shows that companies
combining their ethics and compliance programs tend to have better PEI
scores. The reason for the higher effectiveness measure seems to be
something that I find perfectly rational. Ethics programs, consisting of
measures taken to inculcate organizational values, help to create a
culture that is not only conducive to following rules that are embedded
in law and regulation, but also conducive to compliance with company
mores. A strong ethical culture breeds a more compliant culture.
The symbiotic relationship between ethics and compliance arises
because of the close connection between values and rules. Ethics is
about values and compliance is about rules. You obtain the beneficial
symbiotic effect when the values and the rules live in harmony. A
different result is obtained when you have organizational values that
conflict with the rules.
One of the very exciting areas in compliance today relates to how a
company’s strong ethical culture can impact corporate behavior. One
aspect of this behavioral change relates to the greater tendency of
corporate constituents to follow the applicable rules when the culture is
right. Looking to the future, I envision we will see much more empirical
research that shows the benefits of merging ethics with compliance, and
placing both in the hands of a trusted corporate officer with a catchy
new name—the chief ethics and compliance officer. As we move to the
next level, ethics and compliance will increasingly become a part of a
single program.

45. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Conference, “Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry,” New
York, New York, Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020a.htm
[http://perma.cc/YX7F-CAGQ].
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The last twenty years have demonstrated the benefit of ethics and
compliance in identifying legal risk and taking operational measures to
keep that identified legal risk within the organization’s accepted risk
appetite. In most applications, though, compliance has been the vehicle
that prompts the organization to reduce risk by constraining activity. In
the financial services industry, correspondent banking provides an
illustrative case.
Correspondent banking is the business of effecting funds transfers
for other financial institutions. Because the U.S. dollar is the
international medium of exchange, financial institutions throughout the
world have a need to effect dollar-denominated transfers of funds.
Ethics and compliance professionals in U.S. banks have pointed out that
this type of business presents several different legal risks: money
laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion are the most
obvious and the most notorious. There is no doubt that these compliance
professionals are correct. One consequence of their being right,
however, is that U.S. correspondent banks decided to “de-risk”. To
execute on the de-risking mandate, many U.S. correspondents stopped
providing correspondent banking services to those perceived to present
such risk.
As a result, certain elements of the global financial services
industry now find it increasingly difficult to transact business in dollars.
There is a concern by the U.S. correspondents transferring funds for
Middle Eastern customers that the correspondents might unwittingly be
providing services to a terrorist organization, or be enabling a person or
affected sovereign to evade economic sanctions. So, the correspondents
close accounts for many banks in the Middle East. Similarly, there is a
concern by the U.S. correspondents transferring funds for Latin
American customers that they might unwittingly be providing financial
services to drug traffickers, a money laundering risk. So, they close
accounts for many banks located in Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia.
The de-risking exercise succeeds in its risk-reducing objective, but it
succeeds in an overly broad manner by cutting services indiscriminately
to so many.
The adverse and unintended consequences for certain regions of the
world are clear and present. There are also implications for U.S. policy
with respect to the role of the dollar as the international medium of
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exchange. These issues, while highly consequential, are not the object of
my remarks today; rather, they are a symptom of what compliance can
lead to—namely, a reason to restrict business activity. Given the size of
penalties for violations, and the potential reputational damage associated
with this business, it is easy to understand the business judgment to
avoid risk.
The success of compliance over the last twenty years has
conditioned business leaders to think about compliance as a pathway to
terminate or constrain a risky business relationship. However, it is
possible to look at compliance in a very different way, as a two-way
street and not a “one-way” street. Let me explain what I mean. A sound
and effective compliance program can be used, appropriately in my
view, as a tool that would permit on-boarding of what is seen as risky
business.
To continue with the example of correspondent banking, if a U.S.
correspondent had a sound and effective compliance program that was
well tailored to identify and control the risks of money laundering,
terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion, this correspondent might
become sufficiently confident to on-board risk. This means that instead
of closing many accounts in a specific geographic area, it would
continue with some of these accounts, or even open new accounts. Now,
I do not want anyone to think I am saying that all correspondents can
reasonably have such confidence now. At this point in our journey, I
concede the need to develop greater confidence that the identified risks
can be controlled at a reasonable cost. With that said, I believe that we
will reach a place where ethics and compliance programs are sufficiently
developed so organizations can make considered decisions to on-board
risk and keep it within the accepted risk appetite by using effective
controls. I look forward to that time as we move to the next level.
I mentioned earlier one of the promising new tools to assess the
effectiveness of ethics and compliance programs, and that is the PEI, the
Program Effectiveness Index. The excellent report by the Ethics
Resource Center, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines For Organizations
at Twenty Years, has drawn attention to standards for assessing program
effectiveness. 46 The report states: “Altogether, the lack of assessment
46. ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR
ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY YEARS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
PROMOTION AND RECOGNITION OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS
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standards and guidance on how the quality of a compliance/ethics
program should influence the outcome of a matter create the impression,
validated by the [Ethics Resource Center] and Conference Board studies
. . . that too many judgments are being made inside a black box.”47
While we seem to be on the cusp of a number of promising
indicators, like the PEI, the truth is that we are not there yet. We simply
do not have a tool that will give us an accurate and reliable measure of
program effectiveness. Instead, we have a situation where enforcers
(including those agencies with civil enforcement authority, such as the
banking agencies) tend to be result oriented. When we see that a
particular organization has experienced a major compliance failure, we
tend to view the failure as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the ethics
and compliance program. We reason backward, “if the program were
effective, this would not have happened.” I think this is natural and
understandable for the enforcement community, but it is not necessarily
good policy. To borrow an observation from Senator Ted Kennedy
concerning the Federal sentencing guidelines, this creates “a risk that
companies without substantial compliance programs will get a free ride,
and those with strong programs will not receive the credit that they
deserve.”48
Alternatively, if there were a reliable and acceptable measure of
program effectiveness, this kind of backward reasoning would be
replaced by reliance on the effective measure. Institutions could use the
measure when making arguments for leniency, again assuming that the
measure demonstrated that their programs were effective. It might, of
course, show just the opposite. And there are other, perhaps even more
important, benefits. If an industry and its regulators came to have great
(2012), http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/fsgo-report2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/GVA8PPDG].
47. Id. at 51.
48. Edward M. Kennedy, Senator, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Proceedings of the
Second Symposium on Crime and Punishment in the United States, “Corporate Crime in
America: Strengthening the ‘Good Citizen’ Corporation,” at 120 (Sept. 7-8, 1995),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projectsand-surveys/economic-crimes/19950907-symposium/WCSYMPO_opt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C85M-FDF3].
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confidence in a particular effectiveness measure, this might provide a
foundation for building a program that could be used to on-board risk.
Put differently, a particular organization could have confidence that its
ethics and compliance program would be protective because the
program had been validated by a well-accepted measure of
effectiveness.
Some of the skeptics will say “you are dreaming”. When I hear
them, I am reminded of the words of George Bernard Shaw, and
specifically the reminder to dream things that never were and ask “why
not”.49
Over the past twenty years, as ethics and compliance has moved
through infancy and into early childhood, we have become committed to
the process and procedure that is emblematic of a program. There is
much about this progression that is good. The building of compliance
programs has produced real benefits,50 and these benefits have created
the compliance profession. There is a risk too. The risk is that the
process and procedure that is the substance of the compliance program
will become a kind of iron cage, restraining innovation so that the
organization cannot adapt to changing circumstances. In short, the
process and procedure can stifle speed and agility.
One place where this has occurred recently is in financial services.
Some institutions witnessed some malefactors violating the law and
engaging in anti-competitive practices with respect to the setting of the
Libor rate. Those institutions responded to very specific rate fixing
abuses, but they did not envision that the abuses with respect to Libor
could also be occurring in other businesses, like foreign exchange.
Compliance, in this particular instance, was not adaptive. Compliance
professionals, in this instance, did not show the needed speed and
agility. They did not reason along the lines that “if it is happening
concerning Libor then it might be happening concerning foreign
exchange.”

49. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, Back to Methuselah: In the Beginning, act 1, in
Selected Plays with Prefaces, vol. 2, at 7 (1949).
50. A survey sponsored by the Ethics Resource Center from 2011 “shows that
employees in companies with effective, meaningful codes of conduct and programs . . .
witness fewer incidents of misconduct, and are far more likely to report misconduct
when observed.” ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 46, at 2.
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As compliance becomes increasingly routinized and subject to what
the consultants would call the “repeatable process”, the process can have
a tendency to drive out creative thought. As creativity dissipates, so does
the ability to connect related occurrences. In the next 20 years, we will
need simultaneously to perform repeatable processes and to think
innovatively. We will need to continue to build the routines and
repeatable processes. Yet, we will also need to be sufficiently flexible to
see around corners, to where new problems are emerging, and new risks
to our franchises are developing. This is what it will take to be
successful at the next level.
I commend Fordham for focusing this symposium on compliance
and governance. They are related and intertwined. The four items
discussed all relate to compliance. My last item touches on governance.
As I speak with chief ethics and compliance officers, a regular topic
of conversation is conflict with the business leaders who own the risk.
This is a little unsettling, because during the last twenty years we have
been successful in establishing as a better practice the approval of the
compliance program by the board of directors. One might think that, if
the board of directors approves the compliance program, then it should
not be difficult for the chief ethics and compliance officer to get the
business owners to pay close attention.
The devil here, as in so many other places, lies in the details. It is
usually the implementation of the compliance program that causes the
conflict. It is usually related to the cost of compliance, because the cost
ordinarily affects how the business owner measures success, which is
the size of the business’ profit. The chief ethics and compliance officer
will not be able to resolve the conflict easily, because compliance is a
cost to the business which can make compliance the adversary of the
business owner. The chief ethics and compliance officer will not want to
bring a specific conflict issue to the attention of the board of directors.
While this might be very effective in resolving the specific conflict, it
could absolutely destroy her ability to function effectively thereafter. In
a recent survey of chief ethics and compliance officers conducted by
Price Waterhouse, the survey respondents identified as a problem their
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“struggle to gain the attention of the board of directors.”51 Two specific
issues were identified. One related to fear on the part of the chief ethics
and compliance officer to engage in action to resolve a conflict with a
key business person—a fear of losing one’s job or her place in the
corporate hierarchy. The other problem concerned access to the board of
directors. It is one thing to go before the board of directors annually to
have the compliance program approved. It is quite another to go before
the board of directors to do battle with a senior executive who is
probably before the board of directors on a regular basis.
One possible solution as we move to the next level is to embed
ethics and compliance issues in the disciplines that are more typical of
governance issues involving the board of directors. These would be
issues like strategy, business goals, and risk management, all of which
touch ethics and compliance. Another solution would be to create
escalation pathways to the board of directors for resolving conflicts
between the chief ethics and compliance officer and a senior business
leader.
As I said at the outset, ethics and compliance have come a long way
in a very short time. We have learned a great deal during the journey. As
I look out over the road ahead, I believe we will continue to make
significant progress in business organizations that deliver on their value
proposition, not only to shareholders, but to the other constituents that
these organizations serve, their customers, employees, and communities.
Ethics and compliance will be an important part of that progress,
provided that ethics and compliance is nurtured by a strong ethical
culture, in a company following sound corporate governance, and
employing the best and the brightest personnel. I am excited about the
road ahead.
Thank you for listening.

51. PWC, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A ‘CHIEF’ COMPLIANCE OFFICER: TODAY’S
CHALLENGES, TOMORROW’S OPPORTUNITIES 12 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/mx/es/ries
gos/archivo/2015-03-challenges.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YGX-6Y7E].

